EXHIBIT B-l Original translation of Japanese Monograph No. 24, Southern Army Operations Record,
Note that original 'translation contained approximately 94 pages and /was expanded to 168 pages, .in spite of the fact that much duplicating original material was .eliminated by using footnote reference to direct the reader to qthe.r monographs in coverid (See pages 1, 2, 3, 5, 19",
.the .subject-had already been.
&29* 34> 37> ^ etc*)-
Through Instruction No, 126 to Japanese Government, 12 Oct 45, entitled "Institution for »«ar Records Investigation", steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War ministry and the Japanese General *>taff«* Upon the dissolution of the rtar Ministry and the General staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the immobilization Bureau, the general research job continued and resulted in the development of a series of historical monographs, i^etailed instructions covering the preparation of these monographs were included in i^emoranda IS December 1945 and 21 November 1946, subject "Japanese Operational Histories!!.
The basic material contained in this operational record was developed by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. It should be noted at once, that tne enormous destruction by aerial bombardment and fire has practically wiped out the Tokyo records; much of this material /-as reconstructed from memory.
The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in *».G or G-3 records, however, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable. Further data as a result of continuing research and the occasional recovery of hitherto unavailable original documents will be covered in the subsequent publication of "supplements" by the immobilisation bureau.
The action under this memorandum and incidental detailed instructions, which.followed, were Initiated by the Assistant Chief of Staff/ G-2, 'GtfW,"charged with responsibility- for-execution-of the program under ;G-~ No. 9, SCAP, 2 October 1*945-.
In order to protect the interest of the United state's, in the exploitation of Japanese military infor.nation, sub-paragraph 4 of G.O. No. 9 further provided for the screening of enemy documents and established inventories in Japanese Governmental archives. Careful examination of the first records submitted by the Japanese Government in the summer of 1946 detected a misconception on the part of the Japanese as to what should be included in comparative histories; in a memorandum issued by Assistant-Chief of Staff, G-2, on 21 November 1946, the Imperial Japanese Govern- ( ment *as directed to record the operations of the Japanese forces more extensively. The G-2 Section thereafter assumed coordination of the entire program, including tne establishment of a small historical researcn section within the aTIS (Allied translator and Interpreter Section.)
OPERATION RECORDS OF "* H S SOUTH ARMY
1st Demobilization Department July, 1946
1
OPERATION RECORDS OF mHE SOUTHERN ARMY
Table of Contents Preface -P. /
Chapter I. Situations Prior to the Battle P-2-
Section 1. Directions and Combat Order of the South Army ■■-
n 2. Command for Preparation for the Operation and an Outline of
the Operation • • ■ P& " 3. Drafting a Plan for the Operation ■ ~ P- f " 4, Army and Navy Agreement »*« P>ST " 5. Issue of the Operation Orders- P*f " $. Various Preparations Prior to the Battle—/?/' *" 7. General Conditions Acknowledged by the South Army Prior to the Battle... y
Chapter II. Attack Operation from the Beginning of the Bat-tie +o May 1942
Section 1. Strategic Situations of December 1941 /* //
" 2. Strategic Situations of January 1942 • • P. 19
M 3. Strategic Situations of February./£
" 4. Strategic Situations of March..- f>tj.J
" 5. -Strategic Situations of April • ••/>x0
** 6. Strategic Situations of May.../^jt/
Chapter III. Defense Operations Between June 1942 and June 1943 • - P.
Section 1. Strategic Situations of June 1942 P> *f
. " 2. Strategic Situations of July..,/0 .26
" 3. Strategic Situations of August 'f>l6'
" 4. • Strategic Situations of September. -f>.±7
."' . ......■■RW.iitratfegic" Situations of' 'October • ' ' T1 'ifIff ffi1'fllh'i'tfl'^fttii^tihiii
n 6. Strategic Situations of November.- A £7
" 7. Strategic Situations of December •- P
" 8. Strategic Situations of January 1943 —/?-*^
" 9. Strategic Situations of February p 3-f
" 10. Strategic Situations of March . p$D '
" 11. Strategic Situations of April.. f_ So
" 12. Strategic Situations of May.../?, 31
" 13. Strategic Situations of June-/» 3/
Chapter VI. Defensive Operations Between July 1943 and March 1944 --/* ?/
Section 1. Gist - r> zl'
" 2. Operations of BURMA Sector.*/*- jJ
Part. 1. "U" Operation. Situations up to the Time of Issuing the Order for its Preparation ftJJ
Part 2. "U" Operation • />. H
" 3. Execution of "U" Operation — P.t0
Section 3. Situations of the INDIA Sea Sector y j**
Part 1. Defense Situations Until August 1943 ■ P> '
" 2. Strengthening the Defense of ANDAMAN and NICKOLBAR Sector-
" 3. MANILA Conference
H 4. Defensive Situations of each District »•< A t/~
i
Section 4. Situations North of AUSTRALIA Sector , /», $o
Part 1. Outline " ?.$0
• " 2. East of TIMOR Island.-. ^ J"/
" 3. JAVA Sector
" 4. North BORNEO Sector.-
" 5. CELEBES and South BORNEO Sector - - /». /T"
Section 5. Situations of SIAM and FRENCH-INDO-CHINA Area .fsl>
Part 1. SIAM Sector mA CF
" 2. FRENCH-INDO-CHINA Sector — /> 6"/
Chapter V. Decisive Battle Operation between April 1944 to December 1944 * 7
Section 1. New Commander of the South Army Goes into Action ... P.
" 2. General Situations of the South between April 1944 and May 1944
" -3. Outline of the Operation Plan >•* P. (,/
" 4. Decisive Battle Near PHILIPPINE * a £2
Part 1. Gist - « P- ^
" 2. Preparation for ^-he Decisive Battle .»- A 6^
" -3. Beginning of the Decisive Battle and +he Outline of its Progress
Section 5. Strategic Situations ■ of BURMA Sector.. f,.7l.
■v - *' • ^ Strategic Situations of North AUSTRALIA and *NeV GUINEA • • /: ff
, " 7. Strategic Situations of OtAer Districts .,./>.'
Chapter VT. Hold Out Operations between January 1945 to May 1945- - f>. 7$~~
Section 1. Gist -P> H
" 2. Draft of a Strategic Plan after the Failure of the Battle on
PHILIPPINES ... PT?
" 3. Strategic Situations Near PHILIPPINES ?/
" 4. Strategic Situations Near BURMA*<f J
" 5. Strategic Situations Near NEW GUINEA and North AUSTRALIA P. }6"
" 6. Strategic Situations of BORNEO Sector •
" 7. Situations of Southwest Sector - p. ?f -
H 8. Situations of SIAM and FRENCH-INDO-CHINA Sector - P. %'
H 9. Operation to Send Important Materials to the Homeland P. ? t
Chapter VTI. Defensive Operations between June 1945 to the End of the War v
Section 1. Change of Strategical Plans Causing from +he Fall of BURMA --fiff
" 2. Situations of INDO-CHINA (include BURMA) Sector - f. fo
" 3. Strategic Situations Near PHILIPPINES•••/> f-L
" 4. Strategic Situations of BORNEO Sector^ ?Z
" 5. Situations of Other Districts ....074,
" 6. Situation of the 3rd Air Force a "\
" 7. End of the War .^fef* ^
Preface i^iwUcA,
1. The South^Army gradually began the seizure of the BRITISH MALAYA and the PHILIPPINES, after December 8, 1941. *ho enemy was destroyed in all regions and in February SINGAPORE was captured. In the latter part of February they advanced to RANGOON in BURMa\ and PALEMBANG of SUMATRA was seized. The operations on this side progressed satisfactorily but strategical operations in the PHILIPPINES didnot progress as was expected although the islands had been secured in first part of May.
The enemy on JAVA surrendered in +he course of ten,days after the landings on the head. In BURMA the strategic situation progressed favorably and in May, the south part was captured. Thereupon, the 1st step of the operational duties of the Southern Army was completed.
2. The Southern Army June 1942 held and stabilized the important sections in the south and steadily proceeded to prepare for-fte next operation^. During that time and after the summer of that year, the Southern Army force was sent to MANCHURIA and CHINA, in consideration o#— at»t w?rH ffitnntinn Tn vi.inr of the situation in the southeast PACIFIC,, fcuMas weie dl veiled Ultra alyst
3. The Southern Army endeavored to develop the natural resources of the South fcii a self juJfioicnl baUlev /In order to strengthen the National Army,it became necessary to strengthen the defense of the areas that possess these resources. Because +he strategic situations of the S.E. PACIFIC gradually became unfavorable, areas north of AUSTRALIA urgently needed defensive strengthening. At the same time forces at areas with essential resources began to strengthen their defenses, but in order to carry this out, diversion of troops were necessary. Changing the command system was one of tho methods used to strengthen the defense. In BURMA, old positions were expanded, and important, linos in the ARAKAN Mountain Range were captured. It was also very important to strengthen the area abundant in essential resources. After scrutinizing the situatipn, IMPAL Operation was begun in March, 1944.
At the beginning of this operation, situations were favorable, but the inferior airfprce and the supplying difficulty had suspended this operation.
mhe decreasement of fighting power of the BURMA force in this operation was the cause of misfortune of the next operation.
3
4. After the spring of 1944 strategical situations became critical, the brunt of enemy operations were directed towards NEB" GUINEA and PHILIPPINES. For this reason the, command system of the South*Xrmy was changed, ^he South^Crmy was to command +he whole southern area, Tne South Army began strengthening the posi+ions at PHILIPPINES with all its might. This was because the political and strategical battle on PHILIPPINES woul£ decide the final victory-*!? -'-his war.
then
In the latter part of October, the enemy landed on LEYTE and gradually advanced into PHILIPPINES.
"he South Army fought with all their might but lack of preparations and inferior installations and facilities had forced them +o give- up the decisive baxtle, in December.
5. After the failure of +he decisive battle on PHILIPPINES, the South Army changed their tactics to those of defense, The communications between the homeland and the southern sphere were almost all cut off.
At this time, the Sou*h Army began sending essential materials back to the homeland. It was planned to strengthen the forces on the mainland in ordtfr to protect the Sou+h Army. In spring of 1945» the action of the BRImISH-INDIAN forces became intensive, and then later captured the southern part of BURMA.
6. After this, the South Army endeavored to maintain their self-supplying areas. Reformation of troops and installations were made, but
in August the war ended, (end of Preface)
Chapter I. Situations Prior to the ISar
Section 1. Issuing of Orders and Combat Orders of +he Southern Army
. The mobilization order to the South Army General Headquar+ers was issued'on November 6^1941. * The domraanding.General was JUICHI >T1ERAUCKI and the Chief of General S+aff was Lieut. Gen. .KO ^SUKADA.
On the same day a combat order was issued to the Southern Army and to the 14th, 15th, l6th and 25th Armies which were under its command. The time for its transfer to the Southern Army was 0000 November.
The combat order of the Southern Army was as follows*
Battle Order for the Southern Army
Southern Army Commander: Count, Army General JUICHI TERAUCHI Southern Army General Headquarters
14th Army (loth Division, 48th Division, 65th TwrtspstiriaM Mixed Brigade) nucleus
15th Army (33rd Division, 55th Division—part excluded)
l6th Army (2nd Division, 56th I»dBrendan' Mixed fluigeiae—nucleus)
25th Army (imperial Guard Division, 5th Division,/l8th Division—nucleus)
21st Division
3rd Airforce Group (4th Fighter s^AtdroTi, 3rd Light Bomber s|«a%ron, 1st
Reconnaissance Squadron—nucleus) 5th Airforce Group (2nd Fighter Sq^adronj 3rd Light Bomber squadron, 2
Heavy Bomber sq>iaTtr'o1ns--nucleus) 21st Independent Airgerce Ra**" "\ 21st Independent Mixed Brigade 4-th Independent Mixed Regiment 2nd Independent Engineer Company
3rd Rail( Transportation Department (5th Railway Regiment, 9Ah Railway Regiment—nucleus)
South Army Signal Unit
2nd Field Provost. Marshal Ht*^"*^^
Section 2. Order for the Determining of Strategy and Outline of the Operation,.
On November 6, the Imperial General Headquar+ers issued an order and an outline of strategy (stated below) in +he even* +hat negotiations between UNITED STATES and JAPAN fell through.
Order ^
1. vhe Imperial Headquarters shall make preparations for the seizure of important areas to the south.
2. The commander of the Southern Army shall order the main force, cooperating with the navy, to assemble at INDO-CHINA, South-CHINA, FORMOSA, Southwest Islands, South Sea Islands and prepare for the seizure of important areas to the South.
3. ^he Southern Commander shall carry out a blockade against CHINA, formerly the duty of the 25th Army Commander. %
* . 4. Incase +he Southern Army is attacked by either the UNI"^ STATEfe, BRITAIN-or NETHERLAND '"roops, the commander shall order an attack in self defense. It is'hoped that +he affair stated above can be settled within a limited area.
5. ^he General Commander of the expeditionary force to CHINA, the General Commander of Defense and +he Com- ander of the FORMOSA Army shall assist strategical preparations of Paragraph No. 2.
The Outline of Operations of *he Southern Army
^he Outline of Operations issued by the General Imperial Headquarter is as follows:
Purpose of the Operation.
The operation against the PHILIPPICS, and BRITISH MALAYA shall commence simultaneously with +he cooperation of Ahe combined fleet.
J
Operation No. 1. "•he soixure of EALAYA, BRImISH-BOPJTEO, PHILIPPINES and North SUMATRA shall bo executed.
Operation No. 2. '"he seizure of JAYA.
Operation No. 3. Will be that of cleaning up BURMA. , ~^
Section 3- ^he Draft of Strategical Plans
, "he strategical plans drafted by the Southern Army had followed the plans issued by the Imperial Headquar+er quite closely.
""he outline is as follows:
General Outline of the Strategic Plans of *he Southern Army
l; Objective of *he Operation
a. '"he objective of this operaAion is to destroy and seize the enemy strongholds of BRITAIN, UKP^D S^A^SS, and NSmHERLAND in the southern area.
b. The sectors *ha* are to be seized by the South Army are the PHILIPPINES, BRITISH-MALAYA, JAVA, SUKATRA, BORNEO and TJIOM^etc.
2. Purpose of the Operation
The South Army will cooperate wi*h *he combined fleet and commence operations against PRTT.TPPBSS and BRI^ISH-HALAYA simultaneously, '"he objective of this operation shall be fulfilled in the shortest time possible.
3. Outline Directions for Ahis Qperaxion .
Operations according +o the above paragraph shall be directed as foi^owarr ...
Operation Ko. 1.
1. This operation shall comcence with the landing of the advanced force and an air raid on the PHILIPPINES. After the air corps has successfully played its part, *he main force of each division shall land in the PHILIPPINES and BRI"ISH-MALAYA and capture enemy positions as quiikly as possible.
2. An order shall be issued for xhe commencement of this operation. If the JAPAN-AMERICA negotiation is successful after the above order is issued, the operation shall bo postponed.
3. After enemy positions in DU*"CH BORNEO, MALAYA, and North SUMATRA have been seized, preparations for operations against JAVA will be nade.
Operation Ho. 2.
In coordination with the preparations as stated above, the enemy air force in JAVA shall be put out of action and thus island will be seized.
1. Enemy air bases in southern BURMA will be captured during the 2nd Operation.
Operation No. ^ (^rd stage operation)
Occupied'areas shall be stabilized and held. If possible, the BURMA area will be mopped up. An order for the commencement of this operation will be issued.
The Southern Army had sufficient self confidence for the operation after Ahe landings were a success.
Sec+ion 4. Arnv and Navy Agreement
In ""OKYO November 10, the General Commander of the South Army and the 2nd Fleet Coaoander who was in charge of the Southern Area made ah agreement concerning the execution of landing operations, They arranged the time for its execution and the distribution of forces. The schedule stated above was the basis for the successive landing operation by the army and navy, ""here was not lauch discrepancy between the plan and the actual Operation.
Necessary agreements were made by forces under the Southern Army command and related fleets, based on the above stated plan. (Listed below.)
Between the 14th Army, the 3rd Fleet and the 11th Air Group Between the l6th Army, Ahe 3rd Fleet and the 11th Air Group Between the 25th Army, Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the 3rd Air Group
Section 5- Issuing of Orders for the Operation
On November 10, all Army Commanders (exluding the 15th Army Commander) gathered in TOKYO and received orders for strategical preparations. In the middle part of November, an order (stated as follows) was issued concerning the seizure areas to the south. On November 20th, an order was issued concerning the a*tack, but *he' order for the commencement of this attack was to be held until the results of the diplomatic negotiations at WASHINGTON were clear.
1. "lie Imperial General Headquarter will seize important sectors to the south in order to insure existance and self defense, as well as to establish a new order in the greater east ASIA.
2, ""he General Commander of the Southern Army will cooperate with the navy and seize important areas to the south according to +he following statement.
r
7
A. A separate order will be issued concerning the commencement of the attack.
B. Sectors to be occupied will be the PHILIPPINES, BRITISH-MALAYA, DIWJH INDIES and a part of BURMA.
i.
C. Areas to be seized by each army, as decided on November 20th, are as follows. (The KAWAGUCHI Unit vdll be detached from the 25th Army but the combat order will not be much different.)
14th Army.....................PHILIPPINES"
25th Army.....................MALAY
15th Army................../...SIAM, (defend and establish)
KAWAGUCHI Detachment (Maj. Gen. KAWAGUCHI shall command one Regiment of the 18th Division as a nucleus).......BRITISH-BORNEO
D. The 3rd Air" Group will cooperate in the operations of the 25th Army. The 5th Air Group will go under the command of the 14th Army Commander,
Section 6. Various Preparations Prior to f.he Battle
Various preparations prior to the battle were completed in a very short time, following the Central Orders. The essentials of this is as follows:
1. Establishment of air bases in 8outh FRENCH-DlDO-CHINA and
FORMOSA.
2. mhe deployment and concentration of air and land forces.
On November 16, the General Imperial Headquarter had ordered the Ship Transportation Commander to act under the orders of tkm. General.Commander of the Southern Army. Therefore at the beginning of the war of the total tonnage of ships for the operation of 1,750,000 tons, 1,450,000 tons were used" for,military transportation. 'T
500 ships, including large aBdr small were used in this operation.
'"he establishment of airbases in FRENCH-INDO-CHINA and FORMOSA began in autumn of 1941 and the already completed airbases were expanded. A new airbase was established on FUKOK and TANI Island off FRENCH-INDO-CHINA, but this type of construction was delayed by bad weather, and could not be accomplished as had been hoped.
'"he concentration and deployment of units proceeded unfavorably, due to the limited amount of time, bad weather, and untrained long distant shipping overseas.
Furthermore various air materials were not assembled as scheduled. Lack of fuel was another problem.
\
The concentration and deployment of each army is outlined below.
14th Army.........Advanced Unit (FORMOSA, PALAO)
Main force (FORMOSA, AMAMIOSHIMA)
15th Army.........Main force of the .Imperial Guard Division (South FRENCH-INDO-CHINA) '
16th Army.........SAKAGUCHI Detachment (PALAO)
Others (South CHINA)
KAWAGUCHI Detachment (South CHINA)
3rdfAir Group (about 430 planes) (FRENCH-INDO-CHINA) ^ 5th Air Group (FORMOSA)
Some other units were put under the command of +he South Army commander. The 56th Division (posted at north KYUSHU) was the main force of the diverted force.
On November 25> the General Commander departed from TOKYO and advanced to SAIGON on December 5 via FORMOSA.
%
Section 7. General Condi-1-ions Known by the Southern Army Prior to the Battle
Intelligence of enemy force as known by the Southern Army prior to the battle is as listed below.
A. BRITISH Force of MALAY Area
1. Army
|
CONSTITUTION |
NUMBERS |
TOTAL |
|
|
REGULAR Army |
BRITISH |
10.000. |
About" 80,.000 |
|
mm |
10.000—35.000 |
||
|
AUSTRALIAN |
20.000—10,000 |
||
|
MALAYAN |
Small number |
||
|
VOLUNTEER Army |
Combined |
20,000 • |
20,000 |
<7
|
TYPE |
Number of Companies |
Number Pfanes |
'"DEAL |
Name of the Main Pianos |
|
|
ARMY |
Bombers |
9 |
108 |
264 |
FLENHA32T«5 Comp. FAIRY BUFFALO 4 Comp |
|
Fighters |
9 |
108 |
BUFFALO |
||
|
Observation |
& |
48 |
? |
||
|
NAVY |
Seaplanes |
1 |
18 |
66 |
|
|
Torpedo Planes |
4 |
48 |
mhe main airbase was located aA SINGAPORE. O+.hers were at COTABAR and KEDA prefectures.
3. Navy
i *
|
Type Location |
Battlfl ships |
Carriers |
Cruisers |
Destroyers |
Submarine |
m0TAL |
|
HONGKONG |
1 |
4 |
||||
|
SINGAPORE |
2 |
9 |
6 |
22 |
||
|
•Jest INDIA Sea |
2 |
13 |
14 |
21—33 1 |
||
|
COLOMBO |
2-4 |
|||||
|
AUSTRALIA |
• • |
6 |
||||
|
ZEALAND |
• |
f |
6 • |
* |
*■ - • ■» |
|
|
TOTAL |
4-4 |
z |
10 |
26 |
6 |
68-70 |
|
Classification |
Numbers |
'"O^AL |
|
BRITISH |
1T000 |
37,000 |
|
INDIAN |
8,000 |
|
|
BURMESE |
2,600 |
|
|
CHINESE |
2,000 |
2,000 |
2. Air Force
|
'"vpe of Planes |
Number of Companies |
Number of Planes |
TOTAL |
Chief Planes |
|
Bombers |
1 |
12 |
6o |
FLENHAIM |
|
Pursuit, |
4 |
48 |
One Comp. |
C. U. S. and FILIPINO Forces in the PHILIPPICS 1. Army
|
Classification |
Qualifies- |
Numbers • |
TOTAL |
|
„ /i>§jKu^aru.............., Army |
. MiJ.? .cars. vfisi&JMgps- Enlisted-405b' • ? |
44.000 |
169,000 ' |
|
PHILIPPINE* Defense Army |
Officers were AMERICANS and FILIPINOS. Enlistees: FILIPINOS |
> 125.000 |
|
|
1. It is expected that the PHILIPPINE Defense Army will complete the mobilization of 112,500 by the end of 1941. * , 2. The Regular Army has one '"ank Battalion (54 tanks). |
|||
4-
|
Type Loca+.ion |
Battleships Carriers |
Cruisers |
Destroyers |
TOTAL. |
|
|
MANILA |
4 |
4 |
14 |
10 |
52 |
|
HAWAII Area |
7 17 |
18 |
46 |
28 |
106 |
|
mOTAL |
7 11 |
22 |
60 |
158 |
3. Air Force
|
^voe |
Number of Companies |
■ Number I of ..Pianes |
TOTAL |
|
|
ARMY Planes |
Bombers |
5 |
65 |
219 + 0 244 |
|
Pursuits |
4-5 |
100-125 |
||
|
Observation |
1 |
18 |
||
|
Reconnaissance |
2 |
16 |
||
|
NAVY Planes |
Sea Planes |
' 16 |
66 |
|
|
Reconnaissance |
* 30 |
D. DUTCH EAST BOIES.
• 1. - Army •. " .. • ■ - ••'»••• • '"■ '
^g^^v^;1 < i' iifj.^ i .j j 1 ' '""
|
— |
Qualities • |
Numbers |
Increase in Troops According to the New Conscription Law for Natives |
TOTAL |
|
Inner-^errit ory Armv |
European 102 |
50,000 |
15,000 |
85,000 |
|
Outer-Territory Army_ |
European 1** |
20,000 |
2. Navy
|
Location |
Cruisers |
Des+,rovers |
Submarines |
TOTAL |
|
SURABAYA |
? |
? |
14 |
24 |
3. Air Force
|
Classification |
Number of Companies |
Number of |
TOTAL |
|
|
Army Planes |
Bombers |
7 |
54 |
237 |
|
Fighters |
8 |
140 |
||
|
Reconnaissance |
7 |
T 42 |
||
|
Navy Planes |
Sea Planes |
40 |
75 |
|
|
Others |
3? |
Incomplete investigation of the land and weather was +he cause of lacking pertinent information to enable +he Southern Army to carry out its operation. Especially does this apply to the situation in NEW GUINEA. Our maps were of small scale but larger maps had been taken from the enemy in the beginning of the war.
Chapter II. Offensive Operations from the Beginning of the X-'ar to May 1942 Section 1. Strategic .Situation of December 1941 Par-1.' Outline ■
mhe Southern Army now has had sufficient training for operations in view of the success of its landing operations. The advanced unit and the main force had executed their landing operations satisfactorily and the strategic situation thereafter progressed well. The number of ships lost was high. In December the number lost exceeded Ahe anticipated figure.
Part.2. Offensive Operations in each Area 1. SIAM Area
T'he Imperial Guard Division, fewaerly under the command of the 15th Army commander, occupied SIAM without encountering resistance, '"he 55th Division formerly under the command of the 25th Army commander, landed on SIAM from the sea and captured air bases around that sector.
MALAY Area
On the 4th of December, the advanced unit of the 25th Army (Main force of the 5th Division, part of the l8th Division) deported KAINAN^O and sailed toward MALAY, but during this voyage they were discovered by a BRITISH-sea plane. At dawn of December 8 the main force of the 5th Division landed near SHINKOBRA. The 18th Division with one element (l Infantry Regiment, as a nucleus, commanded by TAKUMI (Maj. Gen.) landed on KOTABAR. At KOTABAR, this force incurred heavy damage from enemy planes. ~
_TKe JEBd Ship Transportation Unit had assembled in TfftMTTT)(ttl Bay -baton Dec ember^I}, depart ej, and ^n, the MFth landed near SHINKOBURA and other areas _ ^ ) ^ l(p
The southward advance army didnot meet much enemy resistance, and enemy positions at PENANG Island on December 19 and IPO on the 28th were easily captured. The TAKUMI Detachment advanced southward along the east seashore line and captured KU»/ANmAN on the jO'ft of -To""OT,y
3. PHILIPPINE Area N
The attack against the PHILIPPINES differed from that on MALAY. First of all an attack on enemy air bases was executed. Then, depending upon the degree of success, an advanced unit was sent to seize the airfields.
The MIURA Detachment sailed together with the SAKAGUCHI Detachment of the 16th Army (one Regiment commanded by laj. Gen. SAKAGUCHI) toward DAVAO and executed successful landings without meeting any resistance.
The 48th Division left FORMOSA and sailing through storms landed ' on LINGAYEN on December 22nd. The main force of the l6th Division left AMAMIOSHIMA and commended their landing operations from December 24th.
During the operations during the advance on MANILA,.the main force met enemy resistance but continued their southward advance after destroying, the enemy. - ' - >^ . -
The 14th Army Headquarters received intelligence concerning the enemy escaping into BATJAN Peninsula, but this was not looked upon as havinjg much importance. The was later the main cause of the difficulties encountered in capturing this peninsula.
The SAKAGUCHI Detachment, which is under the command of the l6th Army, after seising DAVAO, changed their course and captured UORO Island on December the 25th. 70LO
4. BRITISH-BORNEO Area
On December l6th the KAWAGUCHI 'Detachment landed on MIRI Island and captured the oil fields of that sector. This detachment again changed its objective and on December 23, landed near KUCHINfand captured airfields of that sector. This detachment later moved out from North KUCHIN and on December 31st seized BRUNEI.
5. FRENCH-INDO-CHINA Area
Since the Military Defense agreement between JAPAN and FRENCH-INDOCHINA had been established, everything was quite stabilized and calm.
Section 2. Pt,rat,9KJ.c stations ft? o* January 1942
Part 1. Outline
Srategic situations of most areas seemed to be quite favorable. In PHILIPPINES, MANILA was captured on January &rtT. In MALAY, KWALALANPOOL was taken on January 11. The attack was continued until the laAMi^ftw of January, when they reached JOHORE Channel. In BURMA, MORMEN was captured on January 30th. After the 1st step of the PHILIPPINE operation had been finished, the 48th Division and others were gradually transferred +o the l6th Army for the 2nd stage of the operation. Later, the strategic situation on BATAAN did not progress satisfactorily and losses gradually increased.
The South Army commander, on January 22nd, received orders to capture important sectors of BURMA. \
Part 2. Operations of Different Areas
1. BURMA and SIAM Area
The main force of *he 55th Division, which is under the command of the 15th Army concentrated near RAHEN since the beginning of January.
The 33rd Division landed on BANYA and concentrated near RAHEN. One part of the 55th Division, which previously fought in TENACERIUM district captured DAVOY on January 19.
From January 20th, the main force of the 55th Division gradually corssed the BURMA-SIAM border and arrived at Mflnifftl on January 30th.
*^W^^?T llALAY'Area ' -4
The 5th Division of the 25*h Army captured KWUfaiiiPOOfe on January 11. On the 24th, this division made a fast advance *hrough KURUAN and arrived at JOHORE Channel on January 30th.
The main force of the Imperial Guard Division advanced on +he west seashore line and blocke'd enemy counter attacks on -"-he 26th, near BAHABAT, and arrived at JOHORE Channel on *he 30th.
• On the 26th of January air fuel and ammunition was^unloaded near ENDAU after attacks from the air and sea had been supressed and proceeded with the reorganization of airfields near KURUAN and KAHAN.
The main force of the 3rd Air Group cooperated with the 25th Army, and one part of this force cooperated with +he 15th Army. After the 12th tf
January, this air group cooperating wi+h the naval air force, executed air
attacks on SINGAPORE wi+h all its strength but the success of +his attack
was not as great as had been hoped. Enemy planes had escaped to SUMATRA Area and would continue attacks periodicaly.
3. PHILIPPINE Area
The 14th Army captured MAN TLA on January J. ^his operation had proceeded favorably according to schedule; therefore, the Southern Army presumed thavfe its next duties would be to transfer its opera+ions to JAVA. According to the plan, the 5th Air Group was diverted t0 SIAM area. In conformance with changed of +he combat order by the Imperial General Mead4 quarters, +he 48th Division and other units were put under the command of the l6th Army. An order was issued to the l6th Army to seize JAVA.
The situation was that difficulties would undoubtedly arise in the future in the PHILIPPINES but the South Army thought that this affair could be settled after having concluded the JAVA operation according to plan. The Central Headquarters, also with this in mind, executed a changes in the combat order. s
^he enemy escaped into the BATAAN Peninsula, "he iJARA Brigade interchanged with the 48th Division and began an attack on the enemy positions near ABUKAI incurring many losses. They barely captured this position on January 24th. This brigade was prepared chiefly for defense and was untrained for executing attacks. They possessed little power for the next operation.
One part of the l6th Division advanced southwards along the west shores of BATAAN, and another part of this landed on +he south of BAGAK, from the sea, on January 23> but was enveloped by strong enemy forces. This sort of situation on BATAAN gradually increased +he fears of the 14th Army.
4f- BRlTlSH«B0aN50- Area
J* " ,The KAV/AGUCHI Detachment seized LABUAN Island on the 1st* and ^ESSEL^ON on the 3rd.
On the 6th, +his detachment received orders to capture the airfield near BENKAYAN, so this detachment operated from land and sea and captured it on January 2Jth. One part of +his detachment captured TAWAO on January 24th.
5. DUTCH-BORNEO Area
The SAKAGUCHI Detachment of the l6t.h Army, after a ligftt battle, captured '"ARAKAN on the 11th, and BALIKPAPAN on the 24th.
mhe 38th Division which had been engaged in the operation at HONG KONG was put under +he command of the l6th Array. One part of this division
1 x 1
(12<Hh Infantry Regiment Commanded by Maj. Gen. ItO as nucleus) received orders to size ANBON. therefore this unit left HONG KONG on January 12+.h and sailed towards DAVAO. The main force gradually concentrated at KAMURAN Bay in order to advance into JAVA.
The 43th Division which was stationed at PHILIPPINES*was extracted from the 14th Army and put under +he command of +he l6+h Army. This army, for this reason, became very busy preparing for the operation against JAVA.
The I^O Detachment left. DAVAO on January 28th and seized ANBON on t!he 31st.
6. FRENCH-INDO-CHINA Area
'"he situations in FRENCH-INDO-CHINA was calm. mhe 21st Division gradually arrived at FRENCH-INDO-CHINA from Ahe laAter part of January to stabilize and hold FRENCH-INDO-CHINA.
Part 3. The £nemy Sj+ua+ion as Known in the Latter Part, of January
1. BURMA Area
Since the 17+.h Division had newly arrived from INDIA, the main forces in BURMA would be the 1st BURMA Division, the 17th INDIA Division and the 13th INDIAN Independen4- Infantry Brigade.
5+h and 6th Amy were CHINA'S strategic Army which were +0 opera+e in BURMA and two Divisions were expected to enter BURMA in .the near future but the whole force of 8 Divisions would Aake more +han 2 months +0 concentrate -"-heir +roops near MANDALAY.
Enemy air force incurred damages at +he end of December but reinforcements had increased xhe number +0 about 50 planes.
t ■. ' ~~~
2. MALAY Area
The-9th and 11th Divisions of *he 3rd Army and the 45th Independent Brigade of INDIA received heavy damage and the 8xh Division of AUSTRALIA was destroyed in JOHORE prefecture.
mhe air force has received quite a number of reinforcemen+s. It is judged that there were about 200 planes including +he ones in SUMATRA.
3. PHILIPPINE Area
"he 21st, 41s*, 51st and the 91st Divisions began cons+ruc+ion of fortifications in +he north part of BATAAN, and Ahe ls+ aVid 31st Divisions were in the south.
The 8lst Division was stationed on CEBU Island, the 6lst Division on PANAY Island, and the 101st Division on MINDANAO Island.
I tills estimated that there are about- 13 Infantry Battalions.and not more than one Battalion on DUTCH-BORNEO.
Section 3. Strategical Sit,uaxions of February
Part 1. Outline
SINGAPORE had surrendered on February 15. An important step had been taken in the southern operation, ^he stnategic situation as a whole progressed favorably. PALEMBAN, SUMATRA was captured; troops crossed the SIMIAN River and advanced into RANGOON. t'he situation in the PHILIPPINES waw not favorable, fhe forces there were reinforced by the 4th Division and other units in order +o settle this affair.
^he Imperial Headquarters issued an order for the capture of important areas in +he ANDAMAN Islands and xhe commencement of the operation against TIMOR.
The ITO Detachment, captured ANBON and landed on'v,"B.!0R Island ax dawn of January 26th.
Part 2. Strategic Situation in each Area
1. BURMA Area
On February 9+h, xhe 15+h Army was ordered xo destroy the enemy involved in the present operation and advance to the RANGOON sector covering as much land to the north as possible, '"hey were also ordered xo prepare for the attacks on MANDALY and ENANJON. The 55+-h Division of xhe 15th Army crossed the SARUIN River near MOORHEN, the 33**d Division crossed the same river in the north and continued its advance to +he northwest. The enemy on the left bank of SIT^AN River was destroyed. After they'had prepared for the advance to^RANGOON, xhe crossing of the SITTAN River began on Feburary 27th.
2. MALAY Area
"he 25th Army, with its tank unit, commenced xo advance from xhe east side of the wooden bridge of JOHORE Channel. The main force attacked from the district west of the wooden bridge. Speedy exploitations of successes were made and the enemy surrendered on February 15th.
On February 19+.h, the 25th Army commander received an order to capture important sectors of ANDAMAN and the middle and north SUMATRA.
3. PHILIPPINE Area 1
•"he NARA Brigade attacked enemy positions on xhe north slope of Mt. MARIVELES without success. According to the Army order issued on the 13xh, this Brigade retreated xo the district northwest of BALANGA, and reorganization was made after capturing the blockade position.
Strategic situation of the l6th Division remained the same. One part of the force was enveloped by the enemy +o the south of ABUKAI. Another unit was sent as reinforements from the sea but this unit was also enveloped. Rescue operations were already hopeless in Ahe middle of February.
The "Central Headquarter looked upon the critical sitation as of -» great importance and for the development of this situation the 4th Division ' was deployed to the PHILIPPINES. In order -»-o settle the affairis stated above the Southern Army also put the 62nd Regiment of the 21st Division, which was en route FRENCH-INDO-CHINA, under the command of the 14th Army, The Central Headquarters also diverted heavy artillery and went so far as to change the .Senegal Staff gi'ujjidun', of the 14th Army. I / .
DUTCH-INDIES
The 3rd Air Group was successful in attacking PALENBAN and PAKANBAL on the 7th and 8th of February.
The 1st Attack Group, acting under the command of the 3rd Air Group, landed on PALENBAN on February 14+h and seized oil refinery plants, and airfields in the same area. ,
"he main force of the 3$th Division, covered by Ahe 3rd "*orpedo Combat. Unit, sailed in+o MUNtOK< This division immediately crossed 1IUSHI River on boats, and landed on PALENBAN on February l6th.
• t0 capture PALENBAN before the fall of SINGAPORE was looked upon as having great importance, since the oil refineries had been taken in per* feet condition.
One part of -"-he 38th Division changed course from PALENBAN and advanced towards tanJONKARAN seizing the airfield in this place on February 20th. After this they deployed into positions favorable for xhe operations
against JAVA. ■ »•'•■'■
' Tnie.SA^CUCHT^ Captured PANJIERUMASHIN.
In this way the preparations for attack upon JAVA were gradually
completed.
The main force made preparations for land operations against JAVA. The 48th Division left LINGAYEN on February 8th and assembled at HORO Island. The main force of the 2nd Division assembled in KAKURAN Bay. Both forces left at the same time and sailed on JAVA from the east and west. T^e convoy for the east was the 3rd Fleet.and for the west the 1st Southern Expeditionary Fleet.
Prior to this, the Army and Navy air forces had raided important sectors on JAVA.
/
One part of the 48th Division captured BALI Island on February IJ+h in order to secure enemy air fields.
On February 27+h and 28th, a naval baxxle ensued between the enemy fleet and our fleet resulting in a victory for us.
Concerning operations against TIMOR, the 1^0 Detachment with a detachment left ANBON on February 17th, and xhe main force on the lS+h. They were covered by the 2nd "orpedo Combat Unit, '"he main force landed on KUPAN on February 20th, the other part landed on DELI.
Section 4. Strategic Situations for March
Part *1. Outline
In the BURMA area the 15th Army captured RANGOON on March 8tfc and later prepared for *he advance on central BURMA. V,'i+.h the transition of operations in BURMA, the necessity for constructing a railroad connecting BURMA and SIAM was recognized.
In order to lighten the heavy duties of the 15th Army, the SIAM area was put under the direct command of the Southern Army.
At that time one battalion of the 4th Independent Mixed Regiment was stationed at BANYA as well as the air force.
At JAVA, the l6th Army made successful landings on March 3rd. The DUTCH Army surrendered on March 9th.
The 2nd Operation was concluded to be successful. In +he PHILIPPINES attack preparations were'made against enemy positions on BATAAN Peninsula.
Part 2. Operations of Each Areas
1. BURMA Area
4
The 15th Army crossed the SI^TAN River on February 27xh, and cap-ture^HRlIGOON on March 8th without encountering mucji resistance.. ..^j.. ■.. ; ■ ■
The main force of the 55th Division executed running attacks on TQNGOO, and the 33rd'Division on PROMU.
On March 3rd the 55th Division fought with CHIANG KAI SHEK'S 200th Division at T0NG00 and this sector was captured after the battle. The 33rd Division advanced to a district near PROMU.
T7ith the ending of the 2nd southern operation, forces were gradually put under the command, of the 15th Army to increase its power. Under the assumption that this mop-up operation would end before the rainy season, tte Imperial Headquarters, on the 4th, extrated the l8th Division, the 56th Division and other units from the order of battle of the 25+.h Army and enrolled it in the order of ba+tle of the 15th Army.
The 56th Division was transported from KYUSHU directly to BURMA, and gradually executed landings(beginning _on March 26th. After landings
had bean completed, this Division advanded on tONGOO.
The l8+,h Division, which was posted in Southern MALAY prepared for the advancements to BURMA.
OA A V*^" &cr~fo
March l8th the 7th and 12th Air geoup of the 3rd air force were added to the 5+h air *2&s which was supposed t0 cooperate with the 15th Army. Information on hand concerning the enemy situation in BURMA acquired in the la+ter part of March is listed below.
i _
General CHUNG KAI SHEK'S Army entered HJJRMA in accordance with 5th and 6th Army order, ^he commander of Ahe 6th Army was Ta UNKI. The rnmmnjnrier of the 5th Army was jSA JI.
The 49th Division, the 55th Division and the 93rd Division of the 6th Army were posted at MONPAN, ROYKAU and KENmONG.
The 200th Division, 96th Division and the 22nd Division of the 5th Army were posted, the latter two divisions at EDASE and PINMACHI and the 200th Division near m0NG00. mhe 200th Division received heavy damages at T0NG00.
General CHIANG KAI SHSK'S Divisions consist of about 8?000 to 9,000 personnel. The full strength in BURMA is about 45,000. The 17th Division in INDIA received heavy damage'at PROMU and other places. This Division is a* present located near ENANJON. ""heir equipment is fairly good, but their fighting power has decreased. The forces of General CHTJHKr KAI SHEK are gradually increasing but in estimating their speed of concentration, it is judged that the 15th Army can execute its operations in middle BURMA successfully.
2. ''MALAY Area f^J-^f
The 5th Division took charge of keeping peace and order in MALAY. The Imperial Division landed on the S. E._ district of MEDAN oh March *&*hj 1 -and captured SASAfy. on March'I7th. mhe ^ap*ure of North SUMATRA ^s almost completed. mhe 33th Division which was posted at south SITuAtra ;Was ~put under the command of the 25th Army.
The l8th Division prpeared for an advance upon BtfRMA in southern MALAY. One part of Ahis Division received orders Ao capture ANDAMAN, and on the 23rd, this unit landed on PORT PLEA without meeting any resistance.
3. PHILIPPINE Area '
Additional forces and materials were freshly sent +o the 4Ah Army above and beyond Ahe 4th Division. Preparation for the a+tack against BATAAN was executed very carefully. One part of this Army captured SAN JOSE on MINDORO Island on March l6th.
Considering the situation in the PHILIPPINES an order was issued on the 10th, to the KAWAGUCHI Detachment which had previously carried out »
operations on BORNEO, and the KAF/AHURA Detachment (nucleus of one Infan+ry Regiment from the 5th Division of MALAY) Ao operate under the command of 14th Army commander. The accumulation of necessary military goods and materials for the new operation was practically completed by end of March.
4. EASm INDIES Area v -
During the voyage +o JAVA, the l6+h Army received an a+Aack from the enemy fleet buA the protection of the naval escort enabled Ahem to reach their destination quite safely. mhe 2nd Division which is the nucleus of Ahe main force landed near SURAN, located on the northwest end of JAVA. A force led by the 40th Division landed near RENBAN and the '"OMIBAYASHI Detachment, landed near KALIJACHI. After this the operations continued without meeting much resistance, '"he 2nd Division captured BATAVIA on March 5th and the 48th Division capAured SURABAYA on the 7th. '"he DUmCH Army surrendered on the 9th. '"he JAVA operation was practically completed; the operations of the south, based on its plans, were almost accomplished.
During the operation against JAVA, xhe 3rd Air Force cooperated with the l6th Army from the beginning to xhe end. After the JAVA operation had been finished, many units from the l6th Army were diverted t0 +he 15th Array in conformance with an order issued on March l8th and 20th.
Section 5. Strategic Situation in April
Part 1. Outline
mhe second stage of the operation, based on its plans, turned out successfully.
In April the third s'-age of Ahe operation (Operation No. 2) was executed in order to clean-up BRI^E'-INDIAN and CHIANG KAI. SHEK'S Army and t0 cut off reinforcements from-^INA. Operations progressed moderately well, '"he general attitude of >ho:..civilians in BURMA was satisfactory.
In the PHILIPPINES, the attack on BATAAN' coT.enced' on April 3rd. '"he strategic situations progressed moderaAe'l'y well, '"he whole of BATAftll Peninsula'was captured by April 9Ah. In other areas, each division was ordered to hold and stabilize their occupied areas. A BbJuiijo Army Headquarter was newly established on BORNEO, '"he commander wg!s Lieut. Gen. MAEDA.
After April 3rd, -the Navy will take over the duties of guarding
ANDAMAN.
Part 2. OperaAions in Each Area 1. BURMA Area
'"he 15th Army\ advanced ±e- the '"ONGOO and PROMU line in the laAter part of march. *!!hexj?repared for the northward advance which- commenced on April 1st.
Pfc n
c^fiXJ** newly arrived 56th Division advanced east from J0NG00 along
thVSARtfl River, '"he main force of the 55th Division advanced along +he route to MANDALAY, '"he 33rd Division advanced along +he IIUWAI River.
_____ pi**ci»VJ , IIMWW/
After a light ba+tle -«-he 55+-h Division captured PINLIANA on April 22nd. '
'"he 56th Division con'inued *heir fas+. advance, and on April 22nd they arrived a* '"AUKIGI, on the 24th at ROYLEM and on .the 29th at RASHIO.
The 5!>th Division was shipped from MALAY +0 RANGOON. After assem-"bling near TONGOO on +he 15th, this division advanced northward along +hs east side sector of MANDALAY Route. "Tiey arrived a+ YAliESEN on April 24+h and in ■'he district south of KAJIDALAY on the last day of April.
mhe 33rd Division commenced +heir attack on the enemy located near ENANJION on April 17th and destroyed them by +he 24th. A part of CHIANG KAI SliEK'S Army had joined *his baA+le. Later, Ahis division advanced up stream on IRA7.rAI River by boats.
•"he 5+h Air Force coopera+ee very closely with *he 15th"Army,
2. PHILIPPINE Area
After the 14th Army's long a*tack preparations against BATAAN were comple+ed, on April 3rd the ar+illery units executed prepara+ory firings for a**ack, lasting several hours. Af+er +hi.s event, +he whole line commenced its advance. From that time the s+rategic situation progressed favorably, The whole peninsula was captured af+er Ahe forces charged into MARIVELES on April '"he KAWAGUCHI Detachment was put, under Ahe command of the
14th Army commander in order + 0 stabilize the VISAYA Islands.
"his De+achment landed on CEBU on April 10th. Furthermore, +his Detachment was ordered to redeploy to MINDANAO; i+ landed on K0mAPAm0 on .April 29*h^ .RATKEY-island on.-Ap.rii. lQ±h_.
•in order ' + 0 stabilize Ahis island.
* •
Sec+ion 6.' Strategic Situation in May
Part 1. Outline
•"he 3rd s*age operation which + ook place in BURMA progressed favorably, '"his operation ended in May.
Tith Ahe progress of ■'•he operation as mentioned above, a conference was held concerning the aA+ack opera+ions of the SIAH Army ^rhich conference decided Ao send ■'■his Army *o operate at SHIAN prefecture east of the SARUIN River. mhis Army finally crossed ^he border but the rain and terrain condiAions caused much difficulties, '"he progress of this operation was unfavorable, '"he rainy season had also caused great supply difficulties, It was hoped tha+ a re+reat back to their country would 'be execu+ed.
2.3
At PHILIPPINES, +he attack on CORREGIDOR commenced on May 5J-h.
On May 7+h, AMERICAN and FILIPINO Armies surrendered.
The Sou+.hern Army accomplished its duties for the time being.
^he Southern Army ordered each Army +o hold and stabilize i$s occupied areas.
^he NAKAHAmA Detachment (main force e^r 4th Independent Mixed Regiment) was ordered t0 defend BRImISH-BORNEO since the KAHAGUCHI Detachment had been diverted +o +he PHILIPPINES. On May 5th +he BORNEO PePenBe" Army Headquarter was established. (^dlU/^/n
tiU cA**i** 13yfac*&*~ ^m^-^ ^ -j ^uu^
-> At that time,i^he war situation in *ho SOLOMONS dovelopod. On
May 18th, a combat order for +he I7th Army was issued. mhe 35^i J,yfaig-fry Sxigade and wmj other units which were posted in the PHILIPPINES, were extracted from Ahe Southern Army and put inAo •'■he Order of Ba+4-le.of the 17+"h Army.
After the Southern operation had been finished the Imperial Headquarters planned to extract more forces from the Southern Army and reinforce +he ICTAJJ^UNG .Army and others.
On May 19th, the "'ank Regiment, +he Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment, the Heavy Field Artillery Regiment and the Heavy Sieze Artillery UniA were extracted from Aho 14Ah Army.
""he location of +he General Headquarters for *he defense and sAabilization of the South was being studied. mhere were opinions +ha+ SAIGON would be adequate but Central Headquarters staged an opinion that. SINGAPORE would be adequate. It was decided to establish Headquarters at SINGAPORE, af+er subni-tJ-ing *he plan t0 the Central Headquarters.
establishment-of a-Southern "Fuel Depot, in order"Ao carry out various types of work relative Ao faal.
List of our casulaties and capAured arms from the beginning of the Southern operation till the end of the operation in the latter part of May.
1. Our Casualties
Dead..............................About 9,8 00
Injured........................... " 18,000
Hospitalized...................... " 20,000 {
Dead Horses....................... ■ 3,000
2. Captured Arms
Various guns and cannons..........About, 4,000
Machine guns...................... " 10,000
Tanks, etc....................... " 22,000
Part,. 2. Operations in Each Area 1. BURMA Area
The 56th Division continued Aheir northward advance and destroyed the CHINESE Army which had entered BURMA, ^is division charged into UNAN on May 3rd and finally advanced + 0 the SARUIN River line, which was the end of their operation.
One part of this Division advanced to BAHMO, and inAo MI^C-KINA on May 8th. •
After the l8th Division cap+ured MANDALAY on May 1st, +hey were ordered to destroy the CHINESE Army which would +ry to invade SHIAN Province. Therefore, this division advanced to the SARUIN River line.
The main force of the 65th Division advanced from MANDALAY towards MITOKINA along IRAWAJI River district. After the 33rd Division captured MANIWA on May 1st, they advanced along the railway line between MANDALAY and MITOKINA and met with one part of the 56th Division which was advancing southward from MITOKINA at NAB A on May 15th. One part of the Division pursued the retreating BRITISH-INDIAN Army along CHBIDOUIN River, and arrived at KALEWA on May 12f*h.
Another detachment, with th6 object of capturing AKYAP Airfield in mind, changed their course at PROMU and captured AKYAP on May 4th. In +his way, CHINA'S 5th, 6th and the 66th Army, +otal of 9 Division received qui+e a heavy blow, ^he 6t,h Army retreated towards SHARI and FRENCH-INDO-CHINA Sea. Other Armies retreated to a district north of BURMA Route.
The BRITISH Army, after receiving heavy damages, retreated +0 INDIA. On May l8th, the Southern Army Headquarter issued an order to * the 15th Army commander concerning the stabilization of important areas.
2. PHILIPPINE Area • "
. On BATAAN, a force with the 4th Division as nucleus, made
preparations for +he attack against CORREGIDOR.
On +he night of May 5th the at+ack commenced.
On May 7th, all of +he enemy in the PHILIPPINE sector had surrendered.
"he 14th Army planeed to occupy MINDANAO with Ahe KAV/'AMURA Detachment which had previously occupied PANAY and Ahe KAWAGUCHI Detachment which had previously occupied CEBU Island.
The KAWAGUCHI Detachment had already landed near KO^APA^O on April 29th, and the KAY/AMURA Detachment landed near CAGAYAN on May 5"h.
Both of these detachments and the UIURA Detachment coordinated in +he mop-up operation on MINDANAO which was completed in early May.
The NARA Brigade executed mopping-up operations on North LUZON, and the l6th Division on South LUZON.
Part 3. Outline of Enemy Situation at the End of *he Southern Army Operations in the South.
1. Sout'hwest CHINA
o
During the la+ter part of +he BURMA operation, the CHINESE force at KOMLiEI were ordered to advance Ao the'Vest, and two divisions were deployed from the BUNZAN secx.or to KOMMEI. For this reason small battles took place at ^OETSU and RYURYO.
In the first part of June, +he CHINESE forces were destroyed and forced back. From *hat ^iine the situation was quite calm. CHINESE forces were diver*.ed to +he north at the dis+ric4- near the FRENCH-INDOCHINA border. *
2. INDIA
With the progress of our operation in BURMA, BRITAIN gradually strengthened the defense of INDIA.
AMERICAN reinforcements consis+ed of aircraft, mainly bombers.
Forces which have arrived up to *his time were not, very large but it
was expec+ed that the numbers would increase in the future.
i
3. AUSTRALIA
Expeditionary forces were ordered back to the homeland, and forces were reorganized..
^he'prime interest seemed *o-.be the defense of Ahe homeland, and the strong point of the distribution, seemed to be on *he oast and the southeastern shores, ^he main body of the AMERICAN Army was Lhe air force and was gradually dis+ributed along northern AUSrnRALIA. It seemed as though their mission were to execute attacks against NEW GUINEA and mIMOR.
Chapter III. Defensive operation during the period from June 1942 to June 1943.
Paragraph 1. Battle Situation on Juno 1942.
Although there were units operating for sopping up, of remaining enemies in all areas, the greater part of the army took charge of concentration of units, restoration of strength and training of troops. The general situation and military administration more also started satisfactory.
The General Imperial Headquarters successively withdraw forces from the Southern Army. On 10 June, the 10th Air Group and other air units wore ordered to MANCHURIA. On the 12th, the 4th Division which engaged in the capturing of BATAAN Peninsula and CORREGIDOR Island returned to their homeland. On 29 June the Grand Imperial Headquarters sailed bask the Chief of General Staff of the Southern Army to TOKYO and issued orders to the following effect indicating the subsequent measures to be taken in the entire area of the Southern Army. Based on this order, the Southern Army issued orders to each army group.
On she same day, the 14th Amy was relieved from the command of the Southern Army* Thereafter, the PHILIPPINES came under the direct control of the Grand Imperial Headquarters with execution of military administration as the principal objectire.
Orders
1. In order to carry out the Great East ASIA war, the Grand Imperial Headquarters will securely maintain important areas of Southern territory and establish a position of sure victory by self support and preparing for operation by keeping abreast with the general situation.
2. The commander in chief of the Southern Army will take charge of securing and . maintaining the important southern areas and prepare for operation against outlying important areas based on the following in cooperation with the nary.
(1) . Complete defense against BURMA, former BRITISH MALAY, SUMATRA, JAVA and former BRITISH BORNEO and quickly establish and military administration.
(2) . Cooperate in the defense of THAI and INDO-CHINA.
(3) . Continue pressure against CHUNGKING from the direction of BURMA, INDO-CHINA and THAI.
(4) . Carry out air advance attack operation against INDIA and CHINA according to necesaaty. Regarding land advance attack operation against the interior, definite orders will be issued.
(5) . According to neooisaty, it will assist in the defense of the area which the nary is in charge of military administration.
(6) . Carry out necessary propaganda and fifth column activity in INDIA, AUSTRALIA and CHINA.
In order to give systematic assistance to INDIANS regarding liberation of INDIA, and thereby contributing to the execution of the war, a now HIKARI (jfcj ) organization was formed.
A group of INDIANS hold a mama mooting in BANGKOK on 22 Juno and dsoidsd on the organisation of (INDIA Independence League) aiming at the independence of INDIA and the organisation of the INDIA National Army. They hoped for the assistance of the JAPANESE Government.
Subsequently the INDIA Independence League mads a favorable progress and organised its own army In MALAY.
With the temporary conclusion of the southern operation, sir base establishments in the important southern area was ordered by central authority to complete air bases,
Paragraph II. Battle situation in July.
In July, many units of the Southern Army wars transferred mainly to the MANCHURIA and the OTHA area. _
The order of 10 July stated that the entire organisation of the air units under direct control of the Southern Army battle order was dissolved and a new 3rd Air Army battle order was formed. It mas assigned with the Southern Army battle order.
The 3rd Air Div. was then transferred to the CHINA Expeditionary Force. The 3rd Air Army was composed of 4 air groups with the 5th Air Div. as a nucleus and possessed 12 air regiments (5 filter plane regts2 light bomber regts., 3 heavy bomber regts. and 2 reconnaissance plane regts.) ss its actual strength. The main body of the army was disposed in the regions of BURMA and MALAY against the enemy in the INDIA area while a part of it waa posted in the areas of JAVA and SUMATRA against the enemy in the direction of AUSTRALIA.
Necessary M.P. units and prisoner of war internment camps wars' organised and Joined with the battle order of the Southern Army and all armies under its command on 20 July.
Next, on 31 July, the 3rd Field Railroad Headquarters and the Southern Army Signal Unit wore organized and authorised to unify and command main railroad units and signal units in the various southern regions respectively.
Paragraph III. Battle situation in August •
The 5th Division was in charge of security at MALAY Peninsula since the capture of SINGAPORE on February of this year. They wsrs suppossddto return to their homeland but since there was a lack of shipping specs this could not be accomplished. On 6 August the division received the order to return from the Grand Imperial Headquarters. The lack of shipping space mads it impossible to carry out the order*
The general situation of the Southern Army waa uninvontful and the battle situation in the SOLOMON area became tense. For this reason, the 2nd Division at JAVA under the iiissssnil of the 16th Army suddenly entered into the 17th Army
battle order by order of the Grand Imperial Headquarters on 29 August. They were extremely busy on account of changing direction towards RABAUL.
On this same day, the 9th Air Group and the 9th Air Sector Headquarters in MANCHURIA wore ordered to enter into the 3rd Air Amy battle order increasing the air strength in the SUNDA Isles area. About this tins, units of various branches under the no—id of the so—end sf the Southern Army were transferred to the CHINA area for a now campaign.
Paragraph IV. Battle situation in September.
Since the battle situation of the 17th Amy at GUADALCANAL Island became more and acre tense, the 38th Division which was in SUMATRA Island under the command of the 25th Amy entered into the 17th Amy battle order by the order of the Grand Imperial Headquarters on 17 September. The 38th Division hastely sailed from MEDAW and advanced to RABAUL.
In order to defend WAKE and GUAM Island, the 21st Independent Mixed Brigade ♦excluding vehical unit) in FRENCH INDOCHINA which was relieved from the control of the Southern Amy oasis under direct control of the Grand Imperial Headquarters* It sailed from FRENCH INDOCHINA. Organisation of training institution for junior staff members wore ordered and wars entered under direct control of the Southern Amy — 24 September. The Southern Amy accordingly ordered the disposition of those training institutions to areas as follows: Southern Amy candidates for reserve of fleers training unit (SUMARAN). Southern Amy candidate for nan so— lesion unit 9MALACCA). Southern Amy intendenee training department (SINGAPORE). Southern Amy sanitary training department (SINGAPORE) •
Independent garrison units wars organized in order to replenish strength in important southern area following successive transferring of each group engaged in southern operations. Upon completion, the independent garrison units wars disposed as follows by the Grand Imperial Headquarters order of the 26th of Septembers
15th Amy (BURMA) 42nd Independent Garrison Infantry Battalion. 16th Amy (JAVA) 13th Independent Garrison, 14th Independent Garrison. 25th Army (MALAX) 12th Independent Garrison.
JSUHATRA) 15th Independent Garrison, 17 Independent Garrison. BORNEO Garrison Unit
40th Independent Garrison Infantry Battalion. 41st ■ » " w
Paragraph V. Battle situation in October*
The necessity of increasing defense of email SUNDA Isles area in view of enemy's counterattack from the direction of AUSTRALIA became mors and mors apparent* In October the 48th Division which were at Eastern JATA were dispatched to the direction of TIMOR Island.
The INDOCHINA Garrison Army Headquarters waa formed and entered into the Southern amy battle order on ID October in view of the impending battle. It waa stationed in SAIGON.
^9
The construction of a railroad connecting THAI with BURMA was in preparation since June. Since there aav an increase in danger to aoa transportation 1a tho BURMA region, construction of a railroad was decided. Order to complete this railroad by the end of 1943 was loaned by the Grand Imperial Headquarters. Difficult terrain and sickness made tho prospect of tho construction Tory difficult.
The battle situation in tho SOLOMON and NEW GUINEA area became grave. Too battle order of the 8th Army Group was issued on 14 November. Tho 21th Air Group (2 fighter regiments) and other units wore transferred from the Southern Army to tho 8th Army Group.
On 18 November the Southern Army was instructed to assist tho Lime of Ooammml-eation of tho 8th Army Group according to necessaty. This duty became a heavy burden to tho Southern Army. 1a regards to tho return of tho 5th Division in MALAY to their ho erne land, an order for the 5th Division in MALAY to return home mas iosmed em 4 August. This ardor could not bo carried out on account of tho lack of shipping space. The battle situation in the SOLOMON was getting critical. The need for a stronger defense of the Southern Army area caused the General Imperial Headqaartors to suspend the return of the 5th Division. A part of the division (tho 5th Engineer Regiment and 2 infantry battalions) wore suddenly dispatched to tho RABAUL area and entered under tho command of tho 8th Army Groufr. On 27 November another infantry battalion from tho asms division was transferred to the same area.
Paragraph VII. Battle Situation in December.
On 29 December, one heavy bomber regiment aad others wore transferred from tho BURMA area and entered under the command of the 8th Army Groofj. At that time the battle situation of tho some army group on GUADALCANAL became extremely perilous. Oa 4 January tho Grand Imperial Headquarters at last ordered the evacuation of the army group. Tho battle situation of the entire Southern area was still generally quiet. At tho BURMA area the BRITISH-INDIAN troops star tad a drive in De a man or to recapture AKYAB, drove away our first line unit in the vicinity of ITIDOa* aad MTMDO with a unit composed of tho INDIAN 7th Div. as a nucleus.
Tho 15th army attached great importance to this area as the front-lino of defense of BURMA. The 55th Army counter-attacked and drove the enemy from the ISBIA-BUHMA boundary. Soma of tho CHINESE Army crossed the SARUTN River, penetrated into our area and small engagements took place.
1a view of tho general situation, lt wee argent to strengthen our defense against tho AMERICAN and BRITISH counter-attack from the area of AUSTRALIA*
Paragraph fin. Battle Situation in January 1943.
The battle order of tho 19th Army was issued on X January as a precaution, against a BnTTiBH 4hnnAnMJJ»iattaok on BBNDA. Tho main force of tho 48th Division on TIMOR Island and the main force of the 5th Division on tho way to BUNDA Sea area from MALAY and other unite entered under the command of the 19th Army.
The boundary line of former DUTCH HW GUINEA and BRITISH HEW GUINEA was fined between tho 19th Army and the 8th Army Group operating in the SOLOMON and NEW GUDEA
Outline Map of tho Doploymont of tho Southorn Sacpoditionary Group (About tho lot Jan 1943)

In order to strengthen tho defense In JAVA, the 26th Infantry Brigade was placed under the nnmminrl of tho 16th Amy and transferred from the CHINA area. Tho Southern Army mas ordered to form and supervise the headquarters of the THAI Garrison troops which was placed under the command of the Southern Army on 7 January. The Southern Amy field Ordnance Depot, the Southern Army Motor Transport Depot and the Southern Army Freight Depot, mors ordered on 19 January to come under the command of the Southern Amy* "\
On 30 January, the formation of the 7th Air Division (7th Air Group as the main body) mas ordered and entered into the battle order of the 3rd Air Army. This unit was sent to the SUNDA Isles area. On the same day, the 8th Air Group (1 fighter battlaion and 2 heavy bomber battalions) maw placed under tho command of the 3rd Air Army*
The defensive strength at the important southern area was successively increased to counteract the menace of the Allied Army. The defense could not be perfected as expected. The battle situation in the SOLOMONS were not favorable. Tho 56th Division carried out mopping up operation against a part of the CHINESE Amy (approximately one division) stationed along the banks of the SABDB5N in TONAN province. In February it penetrated into the area north of TOETSU destroying enemy units in the main sector in about 2 weeks* and drove the main force to the east bank of the SALWEEN River*
The general situation of the Southern Army in the beginning of 1943 is on the appended chart 1*
Paragraph IX. Battle situation in February.
In the BURMA area, the 55th Div. concentrating its main force to the vicinity of AKTAB and then, assumed the offensive against the BRITISH-INDIAN Army which was attempting to recapture AKTAB.
The construction work of the THAI-BURMA railway was exceedingly difficult and disease was rampart. In view of the necessity of supplying BURMA,, the Central .Authority cut the completion date by 4 months and ordered its completion by the end of August. On 24 February, the formation of- the Southern Amy Railway- Uni.t,was ordered with a view of accelerating the construction work. It was entered into the battle order of the Southern Army* It was composed mainly of the former 2nd Railroad Inspectorate and the 5th and the 9th Railroad Regiments.
On the same date, in order to strengthen the L. of C. Unit in the BURMA area, the formation of the 5th Field Transport Unit (12 Independent Motor Transport Bn), the 16th L. of C. Sanitary Unit (3 L. of C. hospitals) and the 15th Sick Transport Unit (4 Sick Transport Platoons) was ordered and entered in the battle order of the 15th Army. Since the fall of 1942, the Southern Army studied the plan of operation, which will begin after the end of 1943, dealing with the enemy1 s counterattacks against the southern territory. In the latter part of Feb., the Army gathered the plans together and reported its view to the Central Authority summarised as follow
Forces to be organised and reinforced:
Land groups • 2 Diva, and 1 Brigade (BURMA and MALAY). AA defensive group - 2 (Parenban? and Bankalanbulantan AAA Unit - 23 Bns. Independent Eng. Regt. (A) - 2. Shipping Eng. Regt. - 2 (l in BUNDA Sea Area4. THAI and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Garrison Units
The Southern Army requested the reorganisation of the 15th Army into an Army group and organise the army, which will operate westward in BURMA.
Paragraph X. The Battle Situation in March.
In the BURMA area, the counter-attack operation of the 15th Army in the AKTAB area progressed favorably and succeeded in driving the BRITISH-INDIAN troops, from BURMA. The Southern Army needed to strengthen the defense of the little SUNDA Island and meanwhile, the 45th Div. was being organised in the homeland. It was entered in the battle order of the 16th Army on the 1st of March and then transported.
Tho 26th Inf. Brigade was detached from the battle order of the 16th Army and entered in the battle order of the 15th Army.and transferred to BURMA.
The necessity of strengthening the defense of PARENDAN was apparent to the Southern Army since January. All the garrison units were unified and reorganised into the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Aerial Defense Regts. under the command of the PARENBAN Defense Headquarters. It was entered into the battle order of the 25th Army on 3 March.
The 31st Div. was entered under the command of the Army at the end of March to strengthen the 15th Army. It became necessary to strengthen the defense position in BURMA. The battle order of the BURMA Army Group was issued on 27 March.
The 25th Army was responsible to the defense of SUMATRA and MALAY. The defense area was divided and the 25th Divislen became responsible for the defense of SUMATRA. 'MALAY came under the direct control of the Southern Army.
- "-v~" ■ japBMa.jiMjM * ~—^j^w8S8Hmmsmsmemm]esBSSSfe"- - ■■ .
^Jhe deployment of tbe 19th Army in the BANDA Sea Area ""did^nd^roceed as **** expected because of the lack of shipping space and the activities of the enemy submarinee and planes.
Paragraph XI. The Battle Situation in April.
The necessity of strengthening the defense of the Southern territories became apparent due to the intensification of the battle situation in the Southeastern PACIFIC area. The Southern Army made every effort to firmly hold the defense positions in BURMA end the region north of AUSTRALIA, but the shortage of shipping space and the raids of the enemy submarines and planes caused the breakdown of our transportation and supply system.
2*
In the region north of AUSTRALIA, enemy submarines were especially active. The transportation of our foross and supplies of the 5th Div. was seriously hindered. In BURMA, the attacking enemy planes numbered about 1,000 every ten days in January of this year. At present, the attacking enemy planes increased to over 2,000 every ten days. Their sphere of activities was near the T0NGU0-RANG00N line but now it extended to the vicinity of MELGT and DAB0I. Supplying BURMA by ocean going ships became impossible. The necessity to complete the THAI-BURMA railroad became more urgent. The repair and improvements of the roods and highways came to the attention of our authorities.
In the region north of AUSTRALIA the boundary of the battle area of the Southern Army and the 8th Army Group was revised to Long. 140°E. To strengthen the defense of the INDIAN Ocean, especially PARENBAN, the necessity to occupy C0C0S Islands had been discussed. The Southern Army negotiated with the Central Authority and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet but lack of shipping and naval strength, no practical plan could be formulated to capture C0C0S Island.
At that time, the BRITISH Fleet in the INDIAN Ocean was estimated to consist of 5 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, 4 cruisers, and about 25 destroyers and reinforcements were continually coming in. Tho 3rd M.P. Unit, the Survey Unit and the Fortification Unit of the Southern Army, which was being organised, were entered in the battle order of the Southern Army on 12 April.
Paragraph XII. The battle situation in May*
Our forces in all the areas were striving to strengthen the defense. The 19*h Army made special efforts to transport the units and to accumulate the operational materials by utilising email hosts but was unable to make progress as expected*
The units desiined for BURMA advanced by using the road beds constructed for the THAI-BURMA railroad* Results wore not satisfactory as shown by the following. April * 10,000 troops (7,000 INDIAN Army included). May - 3,000 troops. June -4,000 troops.
The Southern Army, in its eagerness, to capture the C0C0S Islands, continued negotiations with the Southern Expeditonary Fleet, but in view of the actual strength' of both' sides, tne'plsif seemed futile. -
Paragraph XIII* Battle Situation in June.
The battle situation in the South PACIFIC area became worse, and the main body of the Air. Div. was detached from the command of the Southern Army and placed under the command of the 8th Area Army.
The necessity of strengthening the defense of ANDAMAN Island and CARNIC0BAR Island nor the defones of the INDIAN Ocean became greater and the Southern Army negotiated with the navy about the plans.
Chapter I?. Defense operations during the period frcm July 1943 to March 1944. Paragraph I* Summary
33
1. The principal duty in the operation of the Southern Army waa to establish a defensive position to repel enemy attacks. Later by increasing their strength, they sight be able to take the offensive. With the situation in the South PACIFIC area growing sores, the amy put ita supreme efforts in strengthening the defense of the region north of AUSTRALIA.
The initial operation plan of the amy waa as follows: ^
(1) . The defense of the Important resource areas of THAI, FRENCH IN DC-CHINA and JAVA and ths oil producing zones of SUMATRA will be the principle object. The anti-aircraft defense of PARENBAN will be increased.
(2) . In order to achieve the said objective, the existing situation of the amy in BURMA will be extended and the strategic line in the ABAKAN Mountains will be captured*
(3) . Defense of ths INDIAN Ooean will be strengthened ao as to prevent the sfrpamning of ths air bases or the advancing of the enemy.
(4) * Three objective had been generally achieved a formidable defense of the region north of AUSTRALIA will be carried out. Since the battle situation in ths Southeastern PACIFIC area underwent an unexpected change, item 4 of this plan had to be carried out at the same tine as the other items* The results sere Incomplete.
2* The general stats of ths Southern Army about August.
(1) . The general situation.
Though the 8th Area Army made desperate efforts to recover its position since the failure of the GUADALCANAL operation, the battle situation was gradually growing worse* There was a great loss of strength and difficulty in obtaining supplies. The Southern Army could not count much on the 8th Area Amy as a support in the eastern rear front* The battle strength of the AMERICANS and the BRITISH gradually increased*
GERMANY twae weakening and Allied Unite destined for EUROPE came to ASIA. After the spring of 1944* the Southern Army could expect an enemy attack from 3 directions east, west and south.
(2) * The poeition of the Southern Army*
The Southern Army seemed to have acquired an invincible position as a result of the initial battle* The strength of the amy in the strategic front fell short due to the Empire's policy of detaching the pick troops from combat duty to occupation duty. The battle situation in the Southeast PACIFIC became worse. Present strength of the army ie as follows:
BURMA - 4 Divs. (33rd, 18th, 55th & 56th).
In addition, ths main force of the new 31st Div. was already entering BURMA, but the strength was not sufficient. MALAX - 2 Garrison Units (5 Bus.)
SUMATRA - 1 Div. (G3)) « 2 Garrison Units. JAVA - 2 Garrison Units. TIMOR Island, the BANDA Sea and Bast NEW GUINEA area - 2 Divs. (5th 48th). FRENCH INDO-CHINA - 1 Div. (21st). THAI - 1 Battalion. BORNEO - 1 Bn.
Total land strength of above - 9 Div. & 6 Garrison Units. Air strength - 3rd Air Army (5 F.D. as nucleus). Naval strength - 2 Southern Expeditionary Fleets.
1 Cruiser Div. (5 cruisers as nucleus).
1 Aircraft Carrier Div. (23 F).
The resources in the southwestern areas, especially the fuel oil are the backbone of the nation and the armed forces. The security of these areas and the maintenance of the communication line between the southwestern areas and the homeland is absolutely necessary for the continuation of the war. The measures to reinforce the defense of the southwestern areas are press sing and important. As a result of repeated negotiation with the Imperial Hdqtrs., the Southern Army planned on epoch making reinforcement of its strength* The aerial defense of the PARENBAN oil fields wore to be perfected and all available defense measures will be taken.
Paragraph II. The Operation in the BURMA Area. s
No. 1 Operation C (IMPHAL Operation).
Outline of circumstances before the preparation order was issued.
1. The view of the Southern ArmyHs<position i* BURMA. ^Mt/a^jt &**7l^, jk^u )
In order to secure the important resource areas, it is necessary to confine the enemy's advancing attack to the east .^3 The 8th Area Army moot whs ale th? enemy and must hold BURMA as a north wing key point of the Southern Army. The view of the BURMA Area Army is the same • -J
AA/-
2. The operation plan of the 15th Army^about May.
the 15th Army underestimated the strength of the BRITISH-INDIAN Army. A division planned to advance to the central plateau of ASSAM Province (south of SILUGADO?) from the direction of the LEDO highway and from the direction of IMPHAL with another division. They wore sent.to capture the region east of PURAMABUTORA?. The army deemed it wise to devise the independence of INDIA by the means of both political and behindVthe-line activities.
3. Directing of the 15th Army by the Southern Army.
The change of the Empire's war strength and the existing state of the East ASIA battle situation made the execution of the plan impossible. The operation could be carried out only after keenly sorutenising the real strength of the both sides and affirming the chance of positive success. In regards to this, it was suggested to the BURMA Area Army to further study the battle situation and draw up a concrete plan of its operation.
The set back of the enveloping movement at JINZEIWa gave the enemy great confidence. In the engagement of DffHAL, the enemy subbornly held out and made no attempt to withdraw. On the other band, the enemy1 a small boat groups In December made frequent appearance on the outhweat coast and finally commenced to land on RAMREE Island. These landings wers later reported to be patrols shich soon withdrew, however, ths Southern Army decided to increase the defense strength. In Dec. they hastily dispatched the 2nd Div. which was mostly concentrated in MALAY. The 2nd Div. waa subsequently concentrated in the BASSEIN sector and completed its preparations at ths snd of February.
In order to unify the command of the various units in that area, the, 28tfr Army was newly created in January.
3. The 15th Army's order to commence with Operation C.
The 15th Army ordered the commencement of Operation C generally in accord with the results of the final study of the operation. The date of the commencement of the operation was as follows t
Main force area - 8 March • AKYAB area - 2 March.
4* Landing of the airborne raiding force.
The 18th Div. gradually pressed by the enemy was forced to retreat to the north of MOGAUNG at the beginning of March. The enemy apparently planned to deatroy the same division by intercepting its line of retreat and to recapture North BURMA and immediately reopen the INDIA-CHINA land route. They landed the airborne raiding force on a sector of ROIBAU?, KATBA and MONIIN on 5 March.
g
The enemy airborne force Immediately built an airfield and constructed a oneycomb positions around it* Its strength was estimated at more than 5,000. The BURMA Area Army was directed by the Southern Army to deal with the enemy with the remaining force.
"i. • The J3U&KA Area Array first ordered the railroad unit to oppose the enemy.-air-•ne force and later attached 2 battalion of the 15th Army reserves. The Army further decided to reinforce with the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade (less 2 battalions). Later 5 battalions from the 28th Army came as reinforcements. Due to the extreme difficulty, communication, the reinforcements lost time. They had to Join in the battle with no definite ordsrs. The enemy could not now be destroyed. The Southern Army arranged to dispatch the 53rd Div., which was concentrated in MALAY. At the beginning of March, they were transferred and their new duty brought them into action against the enemy.
The enemy airborne raiding force resisted tenaciously, being supplied by air but at last retreated to the north of POPIN? before the advance of the 53rd Div. in the middle of April.
5. The main force of the 15th Army, in accordance with the prearranged plan, commenced crossing the CHTNDWIN River at dawn on 8 March. This operation took the enemy by surprise and attained a success that might well be called a bloodless
The conduct of the BURMA Area Army
The BURMA Area Army under the direction of the Southern Army rejected the Southern Army1 a conservative plan and planned an aggressive attack. At the enpl, c of June the BURMA Area Army studied with the representatives of the Imperial'tfdqtrs, and the Southern Army, the plan of operations after the rainy season and of the TMPHAL operation. Its findings summarized as followst ^
A. The advance attack against the central part of ASSAM Province will be too difficult for our troops.
B. TMPHAL operation must be carried out not only to the defensive position in BURMA but also to raise the morale of the people of the homeland.
^■■'■'X' The BURMA Area Army must be reinforced with 3 Div., st lsast 1,000 trucks, ammunitions enough for 4 Div,, and some auxiliary units. TO carry out the foregoing plan, the Southern Army communication' with the central authority at once to have the forces transferred and get the Imperial Headquarters1 permission.
5. Vice-Chief of the General Staff INBDA's trip to TOKYO to communicate with the Imperial Hdqtrs. ^ \
Vice-Chief of the General Staff IN ADA went to TOKYO in the middle of July and reported in detail the existing situation of the Southern Army to the Imperial Hdqtrs. Ho stressed the need of a new offensive operation in the BURMA area. He obtained the Imp. Hdqtrs.1 consent to make preparation for the forthcoming operation. He further obtained the Hdqtrs.' consent on the dispatching of the units (15th Dir., 54th Dir., 24th M.B., Eng. Hdqtrs., Field Transport Hdqtrs., a number of T., etc.), the transporting end delivery of ammunition (enough for 4 Div.'s major engagement) and vehicle parts (for 1,000 trucks)• All wars necessary for the executing of the operation. -\
6. In regards to the execution of operation C, the Imp. H.Q. called for the Southern Army view on the following 4 items. The Southern Army answered that it was fully confident of its success. The operation plan was then approved by the Imp. H.Q.
(1) ; Can our army cope with the coming attack of the main force of the enemy from the direction of BENGAL Bay?
(2) e Can our air force keep paee with the advance attack of the land operation?
(3) . Can the supply keep up with the advance attack? ,
(4) • Although it is planned to envelope and annihilate the enemy in the vicinities of TMPHAL and K0HTMA, is the operation involving a 300 Km. front and 250 Km. depth with the density of our forces really feasible?
7. The issuing of the order for the preparation of Operation C.
The results of the studies conducted by the Southern Army end its conclusion as follows%
A* Due to the insufficient enemy naval strength, particularly the air strength, there Is little probability of tho enemy attacking the mainland of 1CA1AT and SUMATRA from the direction of tho INDIAN Ocean. It is necessary to consider tho chances of the enemy making an attack on the land front as wall as the sea front (especially BASBIN? sector or RANGOON sector).
In determining the strength to bo employed in the TMPHAL operation, it is imperative to have an emergency defensive force. Part of this force may be used to reinforce any part of the attacked sector.
B. The transportation of oar forces end the materials for the rear mill be ^ finished about the end of October. Complications on account of the intensification of the enemy bombings, interruption of traffic, rainy season, etc., may cause the Southern Army to hold tho execution of the operation and order it with due regards to the ststs of tho progress of the preparations.
C. The 15th Army still adheres to the idea that they are meeting a army similar to tho one they defeated in BURMA. The 15th Army desired to make a free and bold annihilating attack, and liaison with the roar were poorly established. The BURMA Ares Army was to give the 15th Amy careful and concrete directions and make clear ths object of strengthening the defense.
D. Tho Southern Army directs only the general principle and leaves room for the BURMA Army to use its own discretion. The Southern Army designates tho main offensive point, taking into consideration the army strength, sea front defense, terrains, transportation power, etc.
After negotiations with tho BURMA Area Army, the Southern Army issued an order for preparation as follows:
The BURMA Area Army will prepare for an operation under the following principles.
1. The BURMA Area Army will assume ths offensive in tho INPARU area and hold in the other fronts. This operation will hereafter be called operation "C."
2. Operation C will be voluntarily carried out after the completion, of the preparations. The main offensive front will be in the area west of the -CHlftDOWIN River. Though the starting tine of the offensive in pre designated after October, it will be indicated in another order.
5. In the event that the enemy takes the offensive before us, we sill break up the enemy in ths positions where the offensive is being prepared and subsequently advance to the important line in the TMPHAL area.
4. In ease the enemy starts a counter-attack in the sea front prior to the execution of Operation C, we will suspend Operation C. We will concentrate the main force of the BURMA Area Amy to the said front and will destroy the enemy. Ths issuance of this order raised the morals of the soldiers in the BURMA Ares Army end ths 15th Army.
No. 2.
Preparation for Operation C.
1. Increase in strength.
The strength was increased for the execution of Operation C. The other foreee forces besides the BURMA Aran Army's own fores are as follows.
A. 31st Division.
It was ooapoaed of the 26th Infantry Group in MALAY as the nucleus. From about April, the heavy equipment units and freights entered BURMA by railroad transportation, while the aain force advanced on foot on the road parallel to the THAI-BURMA railroad* 'The divieion was expected to be concentrated in the sector north of MANDALAY. The THAI-BURMA road was knee deep in mud during the rainy season. Cholera was also razing. The march was extremely difficult but generally proceeded satisfactorily.
B. 54th Division.
One third of this divieion had landed in JAVA about May but the plans ware changed end they were to be used in the Southwest coast of BURMA. The sea transportation to BURMA proceeded favorably beyond expectation and the Div* was able to make preparations for notion by about October*
C. 15th Division.
About May, the divieion was still scattered in a wide area of NANKING, SHANGHAI and HANGCHOW* From about August, it landed at SAIGON and at first concentrated in THAI* The reasons for first concentrating the division in THAI are as follows:
(a)* Sinae the enemy's offense was still unknown, the central authority had anticipated a great possibility of an enemy action from the sea front. It was apparent that the BURMA Area Army would eraply the divieion af it was left to their own discretion. It was necessary for the Southern Army to hold the divieion as a reserve against a possible enemy attack from the sea.
(b}9 Though the divieion is well accustomed to combat against the CHINESE Army, the division needed further training in tactics against the BRITISH Army.
(c) . Comaunioation lines were disrupted fcgr the enemy and the communication system needed reorganization. The CHIENGMAI-TOUNGOO road was constructed by the division*
(d) . It was more convenient to outfit the unit for jungle fighting in THAILAND. The BURMA Area Army saw the necessity of reinforcing the 15th Division with at least one division to execute operation C* Its request for reinforcements were not acted on by the Southern Army*
The Southern Army wished to obtain the 2nd Division, which was in the midst of reorganization in the PHILIPPINES, to the central authorities. Getting the request approved, the Southern Army deeided to attach the 15th Div. to the 15th Army. The 15th Ur. started its movement about the middle of September and first concentration1 its forces in the vicinity of SCHWEBO. The march of the division was carried out by foot and automobile oa the CHIENC^I-KMTAIN?-SCHWEBO-MANDALAY road since the railway was blocked. The road was mostly paved and winded through
39
unihabited hi£i mountains and jungles. The distance was 1,200 Km. to MANDALAY. However, the division carried out the march in high spirit in spite of supply difficulties. The weak and the freights were transported by automobiles. They advanced to the vicinity of MANDALAY in far less tine than expected. It was expected that its preparation will be completed by about the end of November. The bulk of the war materials brought from CHINA with great effort had to be left in THAI. These materials could have been used to a great advantage in supplementing the fighting strength.
D. The 2nd Div.
The division was used as a reserve for the Southern Army in MALAY and it was estimated that ths movement will be completed by the middle of December.
E. 24th Independent Mixed Brigade.
It was to bs enlarged to 4 battalions for the defense of TENASERIM(?).
P. RANGOON Defense Unit.
Reinforced.
G. 5th Engineer H.Q. and 2nd Field Transport H.Q.
These two headquarters were organized after the Southern Army repeatedly aired ita views to the central authority. The engineers and transport unit needed unification in preparation for the coming operation.
Reinforcing of other principle units.
Independent rapid firing guns (changed to 4f m.m.). Field AA guns (Sons organized by reorganizing mobile units). Railway units (2nd Railroad Inspectorate was newly organized).
The railway regiments (2) were alloted to BURMA While the 5th Mobile Railway waa assigned to the THAI-BURMA Railroad. 5th Guerrilla Unit H.Q....(Organized in December and sent to BURMA)• 42nd L. of C. Sector Unit (reassigned to'the"defense of SHAN rYoviricfe
guard duty of the THAI-BURMA Railroad). Automobile Unit (part was tranfferred from SUMATRA, JAVA and MALAY). Replenishment of Supply depot.
Organization of Field replacement Unit (organized ot CHIENCMAI mainly for replacements in the BURMA area).
I. Air tfoits.
The 5th Air Div. was assigned to cooperate with the BURMA Area Army in Operation C. They were in combat continuously since the passing of the rainy season of last year and made a great contribution to land operations. They helped especially in the AKYAB Operation. They fought hard, used tact and initiative, and ware daring. They achieved very satisfactory results. Since each unit sustained losses the main force of the div. devoted itself to reorganization. They also trained at bases in Central TIKI and North MALAX in preparation for the next stage of operation.
11
A part of the div. was assigned to the aerial defense of RANGOON as well as the protection of the shipping group navigating on the west coast of MALAY.
At that tine, the number of oombatable planes of the 5th Air Div. was about 120. It was estimated that they will have about 250 planes by the end of the year.
Since the situation of the PACIFIC Ocean area turned for the worse in the subsequent course of the war, parts of the div. wore repeatedly diverted to that area* The participation of tho Division in Operation C was considerably decreased*
J* Naval strength*
Tho 13th Base Unit was so weakened that it was barely able to fulfill its duty of guarding the rivers near RANGOON and escorting the ships between MERGUI and RANGOON*
The increase in the defense of BASSEIN sector and the increase of the transportation off personnel snd materials between TOUGAN and AKYAB became important to Operation C and to repel a possible enemy attack. Ths reinforcements came as followss
v
Reinforcement of H.Q. (Special Base Unit was changed to Base Unit. Staff, etc. increased.)
Increase of guard unite (One guard unit each at MOUIiffilN and TOUGAN). Increase of ships for coastal operation*
The naval air force was assigned to the security duty of the INDIAN Ocean area and Operation C.
2. Increasing of War Materials.
The mo J or portion of the war materials is composed of ammunition and automobiles Since the railway transportation is overloaded with troops, the major portion of the ammunition and automobiles must be transported by ships. Transportation by ships became dangerous because of enemy bombings and mines. Transportation must be • t.epBpists;du.ny-1sho *i^r**%a^*-%&,%tek?mW* ..the^a^escort .was reinforced by a squadron made up from air units at rest, under reorganization and training. Simultaneously, the 1st Southern ExpeditionaryFFssot waa instructed to dispatch the escort ships to strategic points. The RANGOON aerial defense and mine sweeping forces were increased* Every precaution was taken for defensive measure* Troop transportation was strictly enforced as to allot one ton per man. The remaining were filled to capacity with war materials.
The landings and shelters st CAOFUAGE? M1RUGUI and MOUIMEIN were increased. The Southern Army encouraged all the units concerned with transportation to carry it on as their main operation during the rainy season. They were able to accomplish the greater pert of the transportation with little loss.
The enemy air force mads it impossible to use large ships on the south coast of MALAY. Operations in BURMA was able to be continued even after its isolation from the communication point of view. Tho Southern Army had supplies in preparation for
Tho manuever, showed that the execution of this operation contained various apprehensive points* in tho coarse of study, there took place two arguments for and against tho execution of this operation* Finally, Vice-Chief of the General Staff AYABE acknowledged that ths strategic lias connecting NAGA Hill, KOHTMA and ths heights west of DCPHAL was an absolutely important lino to secure the defense of BURMA from a strategical and tactical point of view* For this reason, it waa necessary to carry out Operation C, although it contained some faults* Ths attitude of the Southern Army was thus settled*
16* 3*
The Execution of Operation C.
1* Early in February 1944, in accordance with the orders from tho Imperial H.Q* ths commander in chief of the Southern Army issued an order to tho BURMA Area Army commander to commence with Operation C anytime after March with an objective of strengthening tho defense of BURMA and at the same time strengthening the defense of the southwest coast of BURMA*
2* Tho morals of the BURMA Area Army and the troops under its command rose high when the order esse* Preparation for the Operation began* The enemy in the INDIA area did not show any activities even after the passing of the rainy season. Action first seen in the DOKO? eras* \
a. DOKO area.
Ths 56th Div* mads BHAMD, TENGYUEH and RYURYO its 3 important key positions* It dispatched a part of the force to KUNRON to counter-attack the CHINESE Army which frequently penetrated into our territory. On each oeoassion it achieved great success. The result showed that our one battalion was generally sufficient to cope with the enemy's one division. Tho division was coping with the enemy, which penetrated into our area early in October, enveloping them everywhere. The DOKO area generally was not regarded as a menace during the execution of the Operation C.
b* TORIANGURU zone.
Since the beginning of October,, the JL8th Div. advanced toward the direction of 1XD0 and planned to check the enemy in the defiles but failed. It was again unsuccessful in its attempt to take advantage of the enemy's crossing of the big river north of MAINGKWAN. The division subsequently carried out in succession a difficult evacuation operation by rear action and was making every effort to hold out*
c.
The area of the southwest coast of BURMA.
Tho enemy was active on the BUCHIDON? - MONDO? line and fequently penetrating into our area by breaking through the front line position of the 55th Div. We ware opposing the enemy by daring infiltration tactics. The SAKURAI group (the infantry grouft of the 55th Div.) advanced to the rear of the enemy in the immediate front by filtering through the gap of the enemy groups. They enveloped a powerful enemy group at JINZBIWA? but due to insufficient strength and shortage of provision they finally stopped the seige and withdrew. \
Operation C. Tne auppliee kept the BURMA Area Amy in oondition for a few months.
3. Completion of the communication roads
a* Operational roads*
WUNTHO - 1BU - SHITAN? road* WUNTHO - YJ5U-MEMANCHE? road
Ths 15th Amy concentrated all of its manpower in building this road* It traversed the almost impossible IUPEE Mountains* It waa a great exploit of the 5th Engineer Unit. It is expected to be completed the first part of December*
MONYNA - KAIEMIO - TAMYU road.
Expected to be completed by the end of December.
THATETMYO - MINBUO - AKYAB road.
Expected to be completed by the end of December. \
b. The rear road*
RAMPAN? - KENTAN - TAKAO road.
Expected to be completed by the end of December•
CHIENGMAI - TOUNGOO road.
Expected to be opened by the end of December. RAHENG - MBSODO road.
The THAI garrison Army placed the THAI Government in charge of its construction the time of the opening was not known*
O* THAI-BURMA Railroad.
Maintenance during the rainy season and the completion of ita defensive installations against the enemy bombing after the rainy season was planned:*
d* TOUNGOO - AKYAB waterway maintenance.
Plan to increase shelter installations.
4* The final stage of Operation C. 1
The manuever as a final stags of the Operation C waa conducted in accordance with the operational plan of the 15th Army at MAYMYO about 10 December in the presence of Vice-Chief of the General Staff AIABE and Chief of Staff NAKA of the BURMA Area Army*
river crossing. The offensive progressed favorably and generally as prearranged. The 31st Div. captured KOHTMA on 6 April and the main force of the 15th Div. advanced to the north of IMPHAL. A part of the 15th Div. intercepted the road between KOHIMA and IMPHAL. The 33rd Div. enveloped part of the BRITISH-INDIAN Army at CAICHIM? and TONZAN and succeeded in capturing 800 automobiles and a great quantity of munitions.
6. Altering of the supreme command system of the Southern Army. ^ The situation of the PACIFIC.
The defense of the PHILIPPINES needed strengthening. The Imperial H.Q. again planned to place the 14th Army under the command of the Southern Army. The Southern Army would be in charge of the operations of the entire PACIFIC areas. The defense of the PHILIPPINE area must be prepared by utilising all the strong points such as aerial navigation, shipping and line of communication. Radical changes in the supreme command system of the Southern Army came about. A majority of the staff was transferred to the 7th Area Army, which was organized at SINGAPORE on 15 march. Consequently, the control of the operations in the BURMA area temporarily came to a halt. This move, though unavoidable, was most regretful.
Cooperation of the INDIAN National Army and the BURMA National Army.
The head of the Provisional Government of free INDIA and the supreme commander of the INDIAN National Army, CHANDRA BOS, proceeded to RANGOON at the beginning of January and confidentially cooperated with the BURMA Area Army. The INDIAN National Army guerilla units advanced to AKTAB, HAKA and FAIAM areas and rendered distinguished services by collecting information and breakingup email enemy units. The INDIAN National Army was supposed to capture NAGA Hill after the capture of IMPHAL and carry on guerilla warfare, but it did not materialise. The fact, that the INDIAN National Army fought well as an auxiliary of the JAPANESE Army amid the difficult supply and incomplete rear organization, showed the leadership ability of BOS. The BURMA National Army was used for guard duty in the rear and discharged its duties in general.
Paragraph III-. • The situation in the area of the INDIAN Ocean.
No. 1.
The state of defense in the INDIAN Ocean area prior to August.
1. Defense about May was all together In an open state as follows. ANDAMAN and NTCOBAR Islands.
Defenseless, except for Naval 12th Special Base Force (about 2,000) and 1 Bn. of 2nd Guard Div. garrisoned at PORT BIAIR.
B. MALAY.
The 18th Ind. Garrison Unit (2 battalions) at SINGAPORE. Thw 12th Ind. Garrison Unit (3 Bns.) was scattered around KUALA LUMPUR and IPOH as its center.
C. SUMATRA.
The main force of the 2nd Guard Dir. was garrisoned at North SUMATRA and two Independent garrison units were garrisoned in Central SUMATRA and South SUMATRA*
2* Uth the decline of GERMANY, the diversion of the U.S. and BRITISH fleet to the INDIAN Ocean area, became possible. At the same time, the situation in THAI became delicate and its future was unknown* Under the circumstances, the reinforcement of the defense of the INDIAN Ocean area became very urgent. There is a fe that the capturing of PAUSMHANG by the enemy and the use of it as an advance base, may end the war in this theatre* The Southern Army, therefore, laid its views before the central authority and obtained their assistance and provided an emergency step for itself* ,
1. Measures provided by the central authority.
Now formation of 84th Ind* Mixed Brig* (4 Bn.) for defense of TENASSERIM area. New formation of 29th Ind. Mixed Brig. (5 Bn.)
_ This brigade is to defend THAI with ite main force. VICTORIA Point and
BAUKET will Is defended with one Bn. each.
The above two brigades were expected to bring their strength into full play about October.
2* Arrangement by the Southern Army.
Dispatched 2 Bn. of the 2nd Guard Div. to Port BLAIR. Dispatched 1 Bn. of 2nd Guard Div. to CARNICOBAR.
*m Reinforcement of the defense of ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Island was carried out in August,
ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands are not only the relay bases between BURMA and SUMATRA but also the advance guard bases of MALAY Peninsula. Had they fallen into the enemy's hands, ths defense of BURMA and SUMATRA would have become very difficult. Weak defense of MALAY Peninsula would have permitted the enemy to overrun the peninsula and furthermore PALEMBANG would have been exposed to the enemy air' attack.
The Southern Army decided to securelfcy hold the.air bases and naval bases and naval bases at ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands. After constructing a reconnaissance of the actual areas it worked out a minimum plan for reinforcing the defense as follows.
Co*)
PORT BLAIR - 4 Ind. Bne* (atlosst 2 Bns.) STEWARf SOUND - 1 Inf. Bn* (atleast 1 Co*) GREAT COCO Island - 2 Inf. Bne* (atleast 1 CAR NICOBAR - 4 Inf. Bns. (atlssst 3 Co.) TERESSA * 1 Inf. Bn. (atleast 1 Co*) CHOURA? - 1 Inf. Company (atleast an observation bait) CAMORTA - 3 Inf. Bn. (atleast 2 Bns.)
The central authority realising the situation of the areas, decided to establish the 1st Southwest Garrison Unit (3 Bns) at PORT BLAIR and the 2nd Southwest Garrison Unit (2 Bns. st CAR NICOBAR). The garrison units will be composed of detachments from the 2nd Guard Div* as the nucleus and ths deficient units of the 2nd Guard Div. be replenished at once*
Hi
No* 3* The MANILA Conference.
In August a conference was held in MANILA to discuss the defense of the areas north of AUSTRALIA. The Southern Army set forth the following views to the Imperial H.Q.
PLAN FOR EE DEFORCING- THE DEFENSE OT THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA
I. General Plan
BURMA will be the base for the right flank. Northern SUMATRA will be the southern base while ANDAMAN and NICOBAR I elands will act as connecting bases. These bases must be secured firmly while the defenees on the MALAY Peninsula,■PALEMBANG and BANGEALAND BLANGTAN will be strengthened.
Explanation
Taking into consideration the general situation, the enemy will probably attack through INDIA. Judging from the disposition of the enemy troops, her air etrength and naval operations, attacks from AUSTRALIAN bases will not be likely thie year. %
The enemy naval strength in the Indian Ocean Area is as follows!
2 or 3 battleships
2 aircraft carriers
3 converted aircraft carriers 5 cruisers
20 destroyers 15 submarines 1,000,000 tons of transport ships
The present enemy strength does not warrant an immediate attack. However, the constant reinforcement of ships makes a counterattack on the isolated islands probable this year. Our defenses, therefore, must be strengthened immediately.
The enemy air strength in August is as follows:
ftOO land Vase planes * 400 naval aircraft' and a noticeable increase of heavy bombers entering INDIA
It is highly necessary that we strengthen our air defenees in the oil producing areas. The defenses in the ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands, too, must be reorganised and a definite decision as to the disposal of the COCOS Islands should be reached.
In defending the Indian Ocean area, we must depend on air and naval units. However, because it is impossible to reinforce the naval unite, we must rely upon the air units. The iand units should secure our air bases' and at the same time must neutralize all enemy air bases. The enemy is expected to overlook the smaller islands and will directly attack SUMATRA and the MALAY Peninsula. Therefore, we cannot neglect defense in these areas.
II. Disposition of troops
V7
1. ANDAMAN and NICOBAE Islands
a. ANDAMAN area (to be called "A" area)
The commander of the 12th Special Naval Base unit will be
the commander-in-chief. The following will be under his comm-
5 infantry battalions 2 artillery battalions 2 shipping engineer companies 1 tank battalion 10 bombers
b. NICOBAE area tto be called nBw area)
The head will be the army unit commander. The following units will be under his command:
S infantry battalions
2 artillery battalions
1 tank battalion
1 shipping engineer company
1 bomber regiment
c. CAMOETA area (to be called N0N area)
The army unit commander will be in command. He will have the following:
The two garrisons will be reorganized into each respective independent mixed brigade (the nucleus of which will be: 4 infantry "battalions* 2 artillery companies, and an engineer unit). In addition one divieion will be created and two defense units for PALEMBANG and BANKALANG BLANGTAN will be newly organized.
Equipment for the defense units:
PALEMBANG: at least 150 anti-aircraft guns at least 100 airplanes
and:
r
S infantry battalions 2 artillery companies 1 shipping engineer company
2.-
SUMATRA Area
BANKALANG BLANGTAN;
at least 70 anti-aircraft guns at least 50 airplanes
RENGAT:
at least 20 anti-aircraft guns at least 10 airplanes
MALAY Peninsula
The two garrisons will he reorganised into two independent mixed "brigades and one division will he created. In addition, there will be one reserve army headquarters division*
III. Commanding system
The NICOBAR, ANDAMAN and SABANG Islands were under the jurisdiction of the navy and ths 25th Army was only supporting the navy. In order to reinforce the isolated Islands, it is impossible for the 25th Army to carry out satisfactory supplying and training. The creation of a commanding body for the ANDAMAN area will be convenient. In addition, it is necessary that another army be organized for the purpose of facilitating the defense of the MALAX Peninsula. One commanding headquarters will therefore be created in MALAY and all navy units in the isolated island area will be put under its command. According to the agreement of the MANILA meeting, the Central Headquarters was steadily proceeding with the execution of the plan.
The general process was as follows: 1. September
The Fourth Division was dispatched to SUMATRA and was put under the command of the 25th Army.
2. September
The two garrisons in SUMATRA were reorganized into the 27th Independent Mixed Brigade and 28th Independent Mixed Brigade, respectively.
3. November
The 53rd Division was put under the command of the Southern Area Army and advanced to MALAY. .
4. January
F
The 29th Army Headquarters was created in MALAY and the 12th Special Naval Base unit was put under the command of the 29th Army commander, only in respect to the land defenses.
5. January
The 35th Independent Mixed Brigade was created in "A" area, the 36th independent Mixed Brigade waa created in "B" area and the 37th Independent Mixed Brigade was created in *Cn area.
6. January
The PALEMBANG and BANKALANG BLANGTAN defense headquarters were created. 7* About January
The 9th Air Division advanced to SUMATRA
IT. The Defensive Situations in Each Area
The defense in the Indian Ocean Area proceeded steadily as mentioned "before. In order to unify the general operations of each army, the Southern Area Army invited the chiefs-of-staff of each army and showed the defensive plans. According to this plan each army hastened reinfofcement for defense. The a rough reinforcements were completed about March.
A. A, B, C areas
1. General plan
POET BLAIR on CAR NICOBAR Island will he secured to the very last. We hope that the enemy will not use them.
2. Disposition of troops "'. ji**-J+**>
a. The 35th Independent Mixed Brigade (defends the ANDAMAN area)
4 infantry battalions occupied the PORT BLAIR area.
2 infantry battalions occupied the large COCOS Island (In
March they advanced by ship). 1 infantry battalion (lacking a company) occupied STEWART
SOUND.
1 infantry company occupied LONG Island which was a connecting base.
b. The 36th Independent Mixed Brigade
This brigade consisted of 4 infantry battalions, most of which were located in the eastern area.
c. The 37th Independent Mixed Brigade
' The main force of* the three infantry battalions occupied CA»-
MOSTA. ' ^lliwviifyi]iii^
One company occupied TRINKAT. _
The main force of one infantry battalion occupied TEHESSA. Island.
One company occupied CHOVfRA Island.
B. MALAY Peninsula
1. The operation area of the 29th Army was south of the line connecting Northern TAVOT Island and PRACHUABKIRIKANU which is north of CHUNPQffi.
2. The duties of the 29th Army were to secure MALAY, maintain peace and to defend Southern Thailand and Southern TENASSERIM in cooperation with the THAILAND Army.
MET?GUI, VICTORIA POINT, and BHUEET were especially defended.
#. Disposition of troops
The army headquarters—TAIPING
MERGUI—One Infantry battalion of the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade
VICTORIA POINT—One infantry battalion of the 29th Independent Mixed Brigade
BHUKET—One infantry battalion of the 29th Independent Mixed Brigade
JOHORE, SINGAPORE—Two Infantry battalions of the 18th Independent
Garrison
MALAX, excluding the atfove mentioned areas—three infantry battalions
of the 12th Independent Garrison
Southern Army reserve unit—53rd Division—concentrated on MALACCA, KUALA LUMPUR and IPOH.
4. As mentioned before, the defense force of MALAX Peninsula was a ^ combination of various units and because of the poor equipment, it was necessary to reorganize the force.
The 53rd Division arrived in MALAY to make up the required strength, but the Division was ordered into BURMA In March and the strength was again diminished.
Therefore in October, the Southern Area Army ordered the 7th Area Army ereesea to organize a defense unit at SINGAPORE and also ordered the 18th Independent Garrison to advance to the CHUHPON area. Concerting with General Headquarters in Toklyo, the Southern Area Army ordered the 94th Division to go under the command of the 29th Army. " Thus, the rough defensive preparations were barely completed.
0. SUMATRA
Northern SUMATRA was the strategic area for defense PALEMBANG was the strategic point of the air defense. The reinforcement of the defense was intently hastened, putting an emphasis on fortification.
1. Disposition of troops
a. The 2nd Guard Division
They were in charge of the defense in AJEH, especially the strategic points at SABANG and the northern coast. Division headquarters was located at MED AN.
b. 27th Independent Mixed Brigade
The main force occupied the state of TAPAKEOLI. \
One and a half battalion occupied NIAS Islands. Half a battalion occupied SIMEULOEE Island. The Brigade headquarters were located at SIECLGA.
c. The 28th Independent Mixed Brigade
The 28th Independent Mixed Brigade was in charge of the defenses in the states of DALEMBANG AND BENKOELEN. The headquarters was located in BAH AT A.
One battalion occupied ENGANO Island.
d. PAUGMBAHG Defense Unit was in charge of the air defense of PALENBANG.
e. PANGKALAN BULANGTAN Defense Unit was in charge of the air defense » in PANGKALANBULANGTAN.
I. The 4th Division
Headquarters was located at PADANG. N Three infantry battalions were put in charge of the defense
of the state of WESTKUST. _ k
Smallunits were dispatched to PALAUTELO in BATU Islands, MUAr-BASIBEEUT on SIBEEUT Island, and BAGAI Island
Section IV Situation of Sector North of AUSTRALIA
Part I Outline
As for the sector north of AUSTRALIA, our plan was to secure the strategic area from SOXNHA Islands to MIMIKA as the first defensive line against enemy attacks on JAVA, CELEBES and the PHILIPPINES from AUSTRALIA, but because the Southern Area Army had adopted the plans to reinforce the BURMA defenses* the. strength of this area was weakened. In May, only 2 divisions, two'independent garrisons, and one independent' garrison battalion were found in areas 4,000 kilometers south of JAVA. However, the main enemy force was* in the SOLOMON area and only four or five divisions and about five hundred airplanes were found in Northern Australia and Western NEW GUINEA. The enemy force, therefore, did not appear strong enough to carry out an immediate attack on the BANDA sea area. As for our air force, the 7th Air Division (headquarters situated in MALANG) and the 23rd Naval Air Division (headquarters located in SQERABAJA), timely attacked the PORT DARWIN area and checked the enemy from gaining air superiority.
Though the 8th Area Army was forced to retreat gradually, it was ' calculated that the enemy*attacks would be a year later. Therefore, the main force of our troops would dsvote their time to strengthening the air defense of the SUMATRA oil producing areas, and the defense of BURMA.
However, the enemy's unexpected speed of attack of the SOLOMON area and our defeat In the MARSHALLS darkened our future prospects. The Imperial Headquarters also acknowledged this, and in September ordered the Southern area army to construct hates for counter-attacks in the sector nerth of AUSTRALIA and to dispatch one or two divisions.
Therefore, ths following plan was prepared for defending this sector.
"GEELVINK Bay area will he the center of the left flank while TIMOR Island, the center of the front line. The AROE, LAI, and TANIMBAR Islands will *a the firet line of defense. GZRAM Island will be the seoond line of defence. In case of failure, rear key positions will be constructed in JAVA, CELEBES and RAIMA-HJRA".
In October, the Second Area Army was organized, and the area east of LOMBQK put under Its control.
last of TIMOR Island
Having completed ite organization, the 19th Army advanced to AMBON in January and hastened the strengthening of the defenses in the east and south areas of BANDA Island. Though the troops dispatched were constantly attacked by enemy planes, our transports cooperated clossly and harbor shelters wsre constructed. Convoy escorts and protecting air force were increased.
In August the following disposition was completed! ,
A. CQERAM Island, AMBON—army headquarters *
B. NEW GUINEA, BABO—Division headquarters and a half infantry
battalion of the 6th Division
KAIMANA—One infantry battalion of the 5th Division
MIMULA—One and a half infantry battalion of the 5th Division
0. Isolated Island area
AROE—Two infantry battalions of the 5th Division
TANIMBAR—Two infantry battalions of the 5th Division and one Infantry battalion of the 18th Division.
KAI—One and a half infantry battalion of the 5th Division
D. TIMOR • •
48th Division headquarters, elx infantry battalions and one tank regiment of the 48thtDivision.
X. SOEMBA Island
One infantry battalion of tho 48th Division I. FLORES Island
Ono infantry company of the 48th Divieion a. SOEMBAWA Island
Half infantry battalion of the 48th Division H. LOMBOK Island
One infantry company of the 48th Division
Change of Defensive Plans
In defending the BANDA sea area, we intended to defend the whole area at first, but intense attacks by enemy planes and increased submarine attacks, and a decrease of our transportation facilities made it impossible to carry out our intentions. We were thus forced to change our plans, that is, to secure only strategic points.
The orders and plans of the Imperial Headquarters reflected the fact that our airplane production was greatly increased at that time. It was the hope that the increased production would make it possible to counter-attack, so the army and navy closely cooperated in constructing air bases and strengthening their forces. Naturally, the land forces put emphasis on the occupation of the strategic bases before the occupation of bases for counter-attacks. Securing of these areas which were feared would be used as naval and air bases by the enemy in areas such as MIMLKA and TIMOR Islands.
Preparations for counter-attacks , ,
---------------------, . . . i _ i .ii. .. . m««Mm-- - ».
The imminence of the situation in the south-east area forced the southern area Army which had been thinking only of the defense in the southern area, to rearrange its disposition in the eastern area immediately. Therefore, the following was decided.
(l) Southern area
a. Isolated islands area (including MIMIKA)
Almost all of the strength of the 5th Division will be deployed, in this area. Divieion headquarters will be at TUAL, 3 infantry battalions on AROE Island, 3 infantry battalions on TANIMBAR Island, and 2 infantry battalions will be on KAI Island.
b. Timor Island
Ths main force of the 48th Division (consisting of 8 infantry battalions, 1 tank regiment, and light mortar battalion) will strengthen the defense of this island. Units now situated on SQENDA Island under the command of the 48th Division will be moved to this island,
c. Small SOXHDA Island (under the control of the 16th Army)
The newly dispatched 46th Division (a part of which was sunk at sea). Its present strength being less than six infantry infantry battalions. It will take over the defense duties from ths 48th Division, SOEMBA Island will be the main point of defense.
SOEMBA Island—three and a half infantry battalions chiefly in WAINGAPOE
FLOEES Island—a half infantry battalion
SOEMBAWA Island—Division headquarters and one and a half infantry battalion
LOMBQK Island—half infantry battalion
(2) Eastern Irea
Simultaneously, Army General Headquarters ordsred all the gradually increasing groups to reinforce the defense of HEW GUINEA.
HOLTiANDIA was decided to be the base for the advance. Bases for oounter-attacke were to be constructed in the GEELVTNX Bay Area. The rear bases for these bases were to be constructed in the SORONG and HATiMAHKRa area.
At first we had no defenses on HAXMAHSRA Island, but taking.' consideration of the probable future change of situation, ths Southern Area Army felt the necessity for immediate fortification of this island as an intermediate bass for ths NEW GUINEA opsration In August, it dispatched a party from the 3rd Ship Transportation Unit and completed the preparation.
(3) Shift of Command
In order to proceed with the preparations for the counter-attack in the NEW GUINEA area, and also to secure ths strategic area in the sector north of AUSTRALIA, the Imperial General Headquarters newly organised the 2nd 'Area Army in October, The Second Army and the 19th Army wore put under the control of the 2nd Area Army.
The 3nd Area Army not only performed ite original duties hut also took oyer the defense of SQENDA Islands east of LOMBQK Strait from ths 16th Army. The 2nd Area Army was put under the direct control of the Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, the area under the control of the 2nd Area Army was excluded from the command of the Southern Area Army. <
(4) Co-operation with the Navy
At that time the Area east of BALI Island (including BALI) was under the command of the navy. The fact that the navy was in command, created many obstacles in strengthening the defense of this area. In order to remove the obstacles, it was decided that the land defense would be put under the control of the highest army commander of each respective area.
Part III JAVA Sector
JAVA, the base of line communication in the south, supplied the Southern Area Army and also helped to supply the 2nd and 8th Area Armies. The defense of JAVA was considered very important because of its great contribution. Reinforcements, however, wore not sent to JAVA because of the serious situations in other areas. Though the Imperial General Headquarters sent the 54th Division to reinforce JAVA, the Southern Area Army sent this division to BURMA.
The gist of defense for JAVA in August.
t *
1. General Plan t
Working in cloee cooperation with the naval and air forces, we shall annihilate the enemy on the beach. The Main Point ef defense will be in Eastern JAVA.
We shall annihilate the enemy en the ocean., Theeenemy will net be allowed te advance into the JAVA Sea.
Strong peeitiens fer counter-attacks will be constructed en strategic points en the southern coast ef JAVA. Mobile forces will be concentrated te repel the enemy.
b.
c. Even in worst cases SQERABAJA , MALANG, BAT AVI A, JAKARTA and BANDOENG will be secured.
3. Disposition ef Troops
Eastern JAVA (east ef SQERABAJA and MALANG Area) One Independent Garrison. One unit, the nucleus ef which will be ene regiment ef the 54th Division (Reserve fer the meblle operation).
Central JAVA (SEMARANG JOKJAKALTA Area) Elements ef an: Independent
5
Garrison (lacking soma elements) 4. Air Defense
We will chiefly defend SQERABAJA, CHEPUI oil fields, BANDOENG and JQKJAKALTA.
According te the above mentioned plan, the 16th Army proceeded te strengthen the defenses until March.
One unit ef the 54th Division teek ever the Ichikari Regiment ef the 2nd Division and the 3rd Battalion ef the Ichikari Regiment was sent te BALI Island.
The CHRISTMAS Island was still under the command ef the navy. One naval company guarded the island.
Part 17 Northern BORNEO Sector
The Northern BORNEO
Part V
Garrison consisted ef two battalions, one ef which was sent te THAILAND. The one remaining battalion had te defend the vast area ef northern BORNEO.
In August, the greater part ef Northern BORNEO was quiet but area adjacent te PALAWANG and SOLD Islands were disturbed' by substantial entries ef spies and subversive parties. Enemy raids were anticipated and with the change ef the general situation. The maintenance ef peace became very difficult. Our strength in BORNEO was net sufficient fer defense so one battalion that had been previously sent to THAILAND was recalled te BORNEO.
Disturbances in Northeastern BORNEO increased. Sources were in TAWITAWI Island and PALAWAN Island but the 14th Army could not check these disturbances. The Borneo Garrison wanted te send expeditionary forces to thess islands and also requested Imperial Headquarters through ths Southern Area Army Headquarters. However, this request waa net realized until March.
In order te meet the situation, headquarters considered moving to OBI. In May the 7th, the army carried out the plan.
CELEBES and Southern BORNEO Sector.
In August the navy teek charge ef the defense of the CELEBES and Southern BORNEO but made no preparation, fer defense except in BALIZPAPAN.
The 22nd Naval Bass Unit at MAKASSAR took charge of the defense ef CELEBES. The defense force ef Southern BORNEO was as follows:
BALIXPAPAN - the 23rd Naval Base Unit
About 2,000 men -About 30 planes
SAMARlNDA—one Infantry company
BANJERMASIN—one Infantry company PANGKALANGBUN—one infantry platoon PONTIANAK—one infantry company
There were no great changes until March
i
Section 7 Situation of THAILAND and TRENCH INDO-CHINA
Part I THAILAND
1. Situation in August
In spite of the situation in the south-eastern area, the successful occupation of BURMA secured the confidence of the people of THAILAND and made the maintenance of peace easy. The THAILAND Army organized an expeditionary force of 35,000 which occupied the area north of LAMPANG. The main force was situated in the state of KIANTUNG. They suffered from malaria and also during the rainy season, from food shortage. The main force, therefore, retreated.to LAMPANG and CHIENGMAI areas for rest. In addition to them a force of about 40,000 was in the central area and of about 10,000 was in the central area. The total strength of the THAILAND Army was estimated at about 100,000, including the police force.
On the other hand, our strength was only one battalion of the 21st Division in the city of BANGKOK and one battalion (under the command of the BORNEO garrison) along the BURMA-THAILAND railroad. The army headquarters carried out the occupation in cooperation .^4 with the THAILAND Army and in general, the result was good.
2. The entrance of the 15th Division +
Since the end of August the 15th Division gradually arrived in THAILAND from SHANGHAI. The division contributed in fostering the fighting power, serving as the general reserve for the Southern Area Army. Meanwhile, they constructed the CHIENGMAI—TOUNGOO Bead. In September the division advanced to BURMA through KIANTuUG.
3. Establishment of the 29th Independent Mixed Brigade
In July the vice chief of the army general staff went to Tokyo to request reinforcements for the THAILAND Occupation. The request was granted and organization of the brigade began in September. It was completed in early October.
The Brigade was situated ae follows: i
2 Infantry battalions defended the southern area in THAILAND and BHUKET—VICTORIA POINT area.
1 infantry battalion guarded the area along the BURMA-THAILAND railroad and the boundary between BURMA and THAILAND.
2 infantry battalions with the main force guarding the BANGKOK area.
i
4. The Advance ef the 7th yield Replacement Unit
In November, the 7th Field Replacement Unit fer Burma arrived in THAILAND and waa temporarily situated in CHIENGMAI. They helped te strengthen the defense'ef NORTHERN THAILAND and it also served as a base fer the advance to BURMA.
5. Construction of the BURMA-THAILAND Railroad.
In spite ef Major-General TAKASAKI's determination (he later died ef illness), the construction of the BURMA-THAILAND Railroad was delayed because ef the rainy season and because ef the violent spread of infectious diseases. It was feared that this delay would be a serious factor in the BURMA Operation. However, because of the newly appointed Major-General ISHIDA's persistent work, with the cooperation ef the THAILAND Occupation force, the construction was completed in spite ef unspeakable difficulties.
6. Performance ef Duties fer Line Communications
The THAILAND Occupation force which had been ordered te supply the BURMA area set up the base fer line communications. They endeavored te obtain and manufacture light weapons* clothes* and food from local resources and contributed immensely.
Part II FRENCH INDO-CHINA Sector
1. In August, the FRENCH INDO-CHINA Occupation Force was situated as follows:
Headquarters at SAIGON Liason office at HANOI
branch office at SHUHUA The 21st Division (lacking a battalion)
The main force was situated in the HAIRONG area, especially guarding HAI-PONG, LAOKAI, HA-Z HI ANY, KAO BANG, DONGDANG, MONGCAY, and SHUHUA.
Elements were situated in Southern FRENCH INDO-CHINA—one battalion at SAIGON, and one battalion at PNON-PENN.
2. Duties ef the FRENCH INDO-CHINA Occupation Force—the Request fer Reinforcements
The occupation force was ordered te defend FRENCH INDO-CHINA in cooperation with the FRENCH INDO-CHINA Government. They were also ordered to harass CHUNGKING. The existing strength, however, was not sufficient te carry out these duties, so they requested permission to organize a "brigade in Southern FRENCH INDO-China in order te concentrate the entire strength ef the 21st Division in northern FRENCH INDO-CHINA. The situations in other areas caused much delay in the relaying ef the request.
The occupation force newly organized the South FRENCH INDO-CHINA Defense Unit. Surplus personnel ef the 21st Division formed the nucleus. Later in January ef 1946, this'defense unit was reorganized into the 70th Independent Mixed Brigade. In January, the troops were situated as fellows:
a. The 21st Division in Northern FRENCH INDO-CHINA
1 regiment—the main force at TONG, and elements at MONGCAY, DONGDANG, and KAO BANG
1 regiment—the main force at FIJIEN, elements at HAZ* HUNY, LAQKAI and FUOL.
1 regiment—the main force at HAI-PHON and elements in the areas west and south of HAI-PHON.
d. The 34th Independent Mixed Brigade Headquarters was located in IURAN,
This brigade took charge of the defense ef FRENCH INDO-CHINA. c. The Defense Unit
He ad quarter's and main force at SAIGON
*
Elements at PNON-PENN.
Chapter V Decisive Battle Operations from April 1944 to December 1944
Section I New command of the Southern Area Army.
I According to the following Imperial General Headquarters order received i on 27 March 194e^ the Southern Area Army took over the command of the entire Southern area.
|
Gist of the Order.
a* The commander of the Southern Area Army will* in cooperation with the navy, rapidly proceed with preparations for battle. He will be in charge of securing and maintaining the peace in strategic areas in the south.
1. The army will secure ANDAMAN, NICOBAR Islands, MALAY, SUMATRA, JAVA, BORNEO, and the sector north of AUSTRALIA, and if necessary, repulse all enemy attacks. They will also maintain peace in BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and the PHILIPPINES and will work in conjuctien with their respective governments.
2. Air operations will be timely carried out against INDIA, CHINA, AUSTRALIA, and NEW GUINEA. Land operations against the enemy hinter land will be carried out according to another order.
3. To meet any change in the situation, materials will have to be obtained from local resources.
4. The defense of important resource areas will be strengthened.
5. Military administration will be rapidly improved, .
6. The Army will "cooperate with the navy to protect sea transportation.
t>. The boundary for the sector operation for the Southern Area Army and the 8th Area Army will be Long. 100 degrees 40 sec. Z (The ADMIRALTY Islands will be included in the 8th Area Army Sector).
The boundary operations for. the Southern Area Army and the FORMOSA Army will be Latitude 20 degrees 10 sec. N.
The PALAU Islands will be included in the 31st Army sector, while the ST. ANDREWS Islands will be included in the Southern Area Army sector.
, II.. The Southern Area Army put the above mentioned orders in action on the 15th of April.
Section II General situation ef the South en April and May 194^ 1. Western front
The BURMA Area Army secured the fronte of NU-KIANG and CHITTAGONOT while it continued the IMPHAL Operations with the 15th Army. Our Army gradually advanced to the IMPHAL Area hut was "brought to a stand still he-cause ef the difficulties ef supplies. EOHIMA wae temporarily occupied by our army but was seen recaptured by the enemy. Our attack en nerth-_ ern BURMA (carried out chiefly by the 18th Division) met a superior enemy and was gradually repelled te the KAMAING area. The main force ef the 3rd Air Army worked in cooperation with the BURMA Area Army but their strength gradually waned.
In order te meet the situation, the Southern Area Army hastily dispatched the 33rd Army, a newly arrived division, and some air units there. Military materials, especially transportation materials were also sent. However, because ef the weak reserve and because ef the poor railroad transportation, the plans were not satisfactorily completed.
2. Eastern front
In early April the 2nd Area Army could do no more than te send the 2nd Army (consisting ef one division as its nucleus) to OTEBLVINK Bay Area (the main force ef the 36th Division to SARMI and one regiment to BIAK Island) "because ef the delay of sea transportation in the western HEW GUINEA area. In the latter part ef April, the enemy surprised HOLLANDIA, where none of our troops except air units and rear echelons were situated. HOLLANDIA was put under the command of the Southern Area Army only several days before (in compliance with the order for the change ef the boundary fer sector operations), but because they were unfamiliar with the area, they could take no direct defensive measures. In order to save HOLLANDIA, the 2nd Area Army commander angrily dispatched one detachment consisting of 1 infantry regiment and 1 mountain gun battalion-from SARMMI. .
In order te meet the pressing situation, the Southern Area Army accelerated the delivery ef troops and war materials fer the 2nd Army. Meanwhile it advanced its commanding pest te MANILA in the middle ef May for the purpose ef completing preparations for the battle ef the Pacific front. On the 2nd ef May, the Southern Area Army was ordered te send the 18th Army te Western NEW GUINEA,
On May 17th, the enemy commenced landings in the SARMI area. The 2nd Area Army called back the HOLLANDIA reinforcement until at that time. Though the 36th Division defeated the enemy, the increase of enemy strength in June became so great that it was disadvantageous for us.
On the 27th of May, the enemy commenced landing en BIAK Island. The detachment on the island fought well and defeated the enemy at a cost. The difference of reinforcements between our force and the enemy force was so great that the enemy soon gained superiority and at the end of June the operation became a standstill. Previously, the Southern Area
Army had decided te send the 2nd Sea Mobile Brigade, which waa waiting at ZAMBOAIGA, te BIAK Island by using nary ships hut this plan was net carried eut until June. Though we advanced to the vicinity ef our destination in June, we returned te SOEONOT because we came in contact with enemy planes. Ve should have taken advantage ef the time when the enemy strength en BIAK I eland was quite small.
The main points ef defense in this area hitherto had been SAUK and BIAK, but in the short period ef time from the end ef April te early May, the Imperial General Headquarters changed the first line ef defense three times—first te BIAK, then to MANOKWARI and at last to SORONG. In ths meantime, the transportation of the 35th and 32nd Divisions wae completed but there was seme dispute as te the distribution ef these divisions. It was finally die* decided te put them on SORONG and HALM AKKRA, in compliance with headquarters withdrawal plan.
It waa Impossible to change the disposition of troops and accumulated materials even if they wanted to because of the difficulties in navigation and especially because ef the shortage of ships. Moreover, the arrival of new units was not expected in the near future. Imperial General Headquarters adhered te its plan and would not allow the change of the fixed destination. Therefore we could do no more then make future operation plans in strict accordance with the fixed plans.
Section III Outline of the Operation Plans
As soon as the Imperial General Headquarters1 order was received, the Southern Area Army began to make operation plans and completed it at the end ef April. A meeting of the army commanders was held on May 5 in SINGAPORE to give them a thorough knowledge ef the plans and te instruct them.
Outline ef the Southern Area Army Operation Plan
f * . «~ • ' * .*'•*' . . ''»
1. The line connecting BURMA, ANDAMAN-NICOBAR, SUMATRA, JAVA, SOENDA Islands, the Northern coast of NEW GUINEA west of SARMI HALMAHERA and the PHILIPPINES will be the main line of defense. The Southern Area Army, in cooperation with the navy, will fight the enemy in this line. The main decisive battle area will be the Pacific front and the BURMA front, while the PHILIPPINES will be the final decisive battle area.
The main line ef defense will be arranged in such a manner as to facilitate the concentration and operation ef the air force, and te facilitate mobile operations for land units.
2* Working in cooperation with the navy and air forces, the BURMA Area Army, the 7th Area Army (ANDAMAN—NICOBAR, MALAY, SUMATRA, and JAVA), the 2nd Area Army (SOENDA Island, Western NEW GVINEA, HALMAHERA, and CELEBES) and the 14th Army (PHILIPPINES) will make preparations for operations, secure strategic areas in the main line of defense and defeat the enemy.
^3
BURMA-PALEMBANG area and the "Square Jar tress11 (GEEL7INX Bay, PALAD, HALMAHERA and MAINDANAO) will he especially secured. Mobile operations will be taken /into special consideration in preparing for the defense in BURMA, and consideration for the final decisive battle will be given in preparing the defense fer the PHILIPPINES. ' The BURMA Area Army will be responsible for cutting off enemy communication routes from INDIA to CHINA.
3. As for the Air forces, the operation area will be divided into two sectors. The 3rd Air Army will be in charge ef the sector west of BORNEO (including BORNEO), while the 4th Air Army will be in charge of the sector east ef BORNEO. The former will concentrate its entire strength in the Pacific Area while the latter will concentrate en the BURMA-PALEMBANG area. By timely moving their strength and by working in close cooperation with the navy and land force, they will defeat the enemy.
4. The THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Occupation forces will take charge ef maintaining peace in their respective areas. The 7th Area Army will be in charge of line communications for the entire Southern area.
All armies will endeavor to obtain necessary materials from local resources.
5. The present strategic disposition of the troops will not be changed, the BURMA Area Army, the 2nd Area Army, and the 14th* Army will be reinforced in the near ruture with one division each. All armiea will be reorganized (e. g. the 14th army will organize 4 mixed brigades). ' The air force will be gradually reinforced with new strength. Meanwhile the 4th Air Army will withdraw to the PHILIPPINES for recuperation.
6. Materials will be distributed according to its .necessity. - The Pacific and BURMA fronts being in urgent need will be supplied first. Priority will be given for ^supplies to the air force. ,
7. Generally speaking, the preparation for operation is Insufficient in
the Pacific front, especially in the PHILIPPINES area. In order to reinforce the strength, to increase the materials, and to strengthen the _ installations, the Southern Area Army will move to this area.
Section 17 The Decisive Battle of the*PHILIPPINES Area Part I Giet
Originally, the PHILIPPINES was the center of the Great Eastern Go-prosperity o< oho Sphere. It was especially an important key position for the maintenance of transportation between Japan proper and the South. The final consequences of the Imperial warfare, therefore, depended en the decisive battle for the PHILIPPINES. Hitherto the PHILIPPINES had been utilized only as a base fer line communications and was no ^considered a strategic area. Defensive preparations commenced only recently.
The Imperial Headquarters laid down its plans fer the strengthening ef the defense ef the PHILIPPINES last autumn, but the plan was net carried out satisfactorily. Though the concrete plans for the fortification were finally completed this spring* it took an unexpectedly long time for it to reach the smaller units in remote areas, so actually there were no preparations. It was difficult to make these small units realize that they were no longer an occupation force but a fighting force.
In the meantime the speed of the enemy's counter-attacks were so rapid that our defense could not keep pace. In September, air attacks became especially fieree and in October, it not only wiped out our air force but also destroyed our transportation facilities.
In late October the enemy landed in the LEYTE area and we endeavored te defeat the enemy by sending as much strength as possible, but because of our inferior materials, equipment and strength, we were forced te give up the LETTE Operation after two months.
Part II Preparation for the Decisive Battle
1. As the enemy18 intention of attacking the PHILIPPINES became apparent, 2 headquarters reconnaisance regiments were put under the command of the Southern Area Army in the middle of May. The 2nd Air Division (7 fighter regiments, 3 assault regiments» and 5 heavy bomber regiments) and the 4th Air Division (consisting of the land * service units of the air force) were put under the command of the Southern Area Army. In addition, the 25th Air Brigade (l fighter regiment, 1 light bomber regiment, and one assault regiment) was placed under the command of the Southern Area Army in mid-June.
The reorganization of the four mixed brigades in the PHILIPPINES was completed in the middle of June.
All units gradually arrived-in the PHILIPPINES in late May and devoted their time in training. All land and air units hurried the construction and fortification of air bases.
The enemy's capture of MOEOTAI and PALAU in July 1944 foretold attacks on the PHILIPPINES. The time of attack was expected to be in early autumn. Prom early September to the middle ef that month, carrier-based planes carried out the first attacks on the PHILIPPINES.
The enemy apparantly intended to wipe out our air force and simultaneously reconnoiter our area. i(
2. In July, the Imperial General Headquarters issued the order to prepare for the decisive battle in the PHILIPPINES. The Southern Area Army took immediate measures to speed up the defenses.
a. The Southern Area Army in early August issued the erder te prepare fer the "She no. 1 operation". The purpose was to unify the operations by the navy, 14th Area Army and the 4th Air Army.
b. On July 7, the 14th Army, which had hitherto occupied the ^ PHILIPPINES, was reorganised into the 14th Area Army. At the same time, the 35th Army was organized to control units in central and southern PHILIPPINES. The 35th Area Army wormed under the 14th Area Army. The 14th Area* Army, in late August, ordered the preparation for the "Sho no. 1 operation" and held a meeting ef its commanders.
c. In July and in August, the Southern Area Army sent the chief of general staff and his party to speed up the operation.
d. The Southern Area Army general headquarters moved to the PHILIPPINES to promote the preparation fer the "She no. 1 operation". Because of the complicated relationship with the 14th Area Army, the 4th Air Army, the Combined Fleet, and the 3rd Southern Expeditionary Fleet, it became disadvantageous fer headquarters te stay there. The Southern Area Army thought it better to leave the operation in the hands of the 14th Area Army (putting the 4th Air Army under its control if necessary) and the 3rd Expeditionary Fleet. The Southern Area Army asked Imperial General Headquarters for its sanction in early August to move its headquarters to SINGAPORE or SAIGON sometime in early September, but was denied the request.
e. The Southern Area Army Headquarters advised Imperial General Headquarters to change the commander and staff officers of the 14th Area Army.
(Note)—According to the Imperial General Headquarters* erder,. the rough preparation fer the "Sho no. 1 operation" was te be completed in late August but no unit arrived, before the specified time. The completion of the preparations was not expected until the end of Oct.
In other words, units on isolated islands would net get a thorough knowledge ef the erder fer about three months.
The 14th Area Army had been assigned as an occupational force and it was difficult to convert it into a combat i t force. s
Because the Southern Area Army expected enemy attacks in the near future, they sent Colonel MITAMA, chief ef the planning section, to TOKYO to report on the first enemy air raid and to report on the progress of defenses for the PHILIPPINES. He also went there te talk over important operation plana.
The relieving important matters were presented to Imperial General Headquarters at that time.
a. "It is necessary to put the 'She no. 1 operation1 in action at once and move the necessary troops. Since positive enemy attacks are expected in the very near future, the success of 'She no. 1 operation1 relies on its timely commencement.
Because of the poor communication system, a quick decision is highly desirable.
As soon as the order is issued, the necessary strength for this operation, especially the air force, will he moved from the outside areas to the Southern area.
Much delay is expected because of difficult transportation, and it may he necessary for them to fight before they are thoroughly oriented with the situation. As a consequence, they may not be able to utilize their full power.
b. "The attack against the enemy task force by the air force must be approved. •
Imperial General Headquarters wants to with-hold the air force in spite if the advance of the enemy task force until such time of the landing. This is disadvantageous for the fSho no. 1 Operation1.
If the enemy task force operation ie checked in its early stage, we can freely carry out our future plans, at the same time, we would be disrupting the enemy's plan/s.
These facts were keenly realized after the first enemy air attack. If the preparation^or the air operation is completed, if the air strength could be retained, and if it would be pos-• '* v sible to timeljr.counter-attack enemy landings, Imperial Ge-• neral Headquarters plans would be generally approved. However it is impossible to carry the plan out successfully under the present conditions of the preparation".
The Imperial General Headquarters replied as follows:
a. "As for the commencement of the !Sho no. 1 Operation1, we
are doing our best to complete the preparations in the near future.
b. "The attacks against the enemy task force are not sure to
succeed. Moreover, it may decrease our strength and may interfere with the combined operation at the time of enemy landings.
The attack against the enemy task force, therefore, cannot be approved. However, we have no objections if elements of the air force take opportune moments in carrying out attacks".
L 7 C
4. The Southern Area Army concluded the enemy's attack against the PHILIPPINES as followsI
Soon after the completion of the air oases in MOROTAI and PALAU, tho enemy will attack the PHILIPPINES. The enemy will undoubtedly attack LUZON because of its political and strategic significance. It is expected that the enemy will attack central and southern PHILIPPINES first for the purpose of constructing air bases, and then .attack LUZON. .1 *
It is also expected that the enemy will pass through SULU Sea (between PHILIPPINES AND BORNEO), the weakest point in our defense. Using southern MINDANAO, northern BORNEO and the islands in SULU Seal as bases they will attack the CHINA Sea, coast of LUZON.
MOROTAI and PALAU are too far from LUZON to be used as air bases and an immediate attack is not imminent. Attacks against LUZON probably will not be carried out until advanced air bases have been secured. In order to guard against such possibilities, we placed the 37th Army (which had been under the command of the 7th Area Army) under the direct control of the Southern Area Army. They were placed there to strengthen the SULU Sea defense.
5. Imperial General Headquarters and the Southern Area Army discussed the battle for the PHILIPPINES several times. Imperial General Headquarters hold the opinion that I
The decisive battle should be carried out in LUZON, while in other strategic areas only holding actions should be carried
On the other hand, the Southern Area Army held that:
The success of the battle for LUZON can never be attained if; other strategic areas, especially BISAYA, are left in the hands of the enemy. They "may use'- frhestf- a*eae" for airbase*. Decisive battles should be carried whenever and wherever the enemy attacks.
It was agreed that the terrain in the PHILIPPINES made decisive battles in other areas disadvantageous because it created an obstacle in the rapid movement of the required strength. However, because of the fact that the PHILIPPINES Operation was to be carried out chiefly by the air force, the possibility of success in other areas was also great. Insufficient time for preparation caused the Southern Area Army to doubt the successes in these other areas,
6. The 14th Area Army commander was relieved of his past in early October and was replaced by General HQBUN YAMASHITA. The morale of the officers and men in the PHILIPPINES was greatly increased, but it was deeply regretted that his appointment was too late.
In summary, the "Sho no* 1 Operation11 had to he commenced immediately even though rough preparations had not been completed.
Part III The Battle ef LETTS
The Outline ef its Progress
1.
On September 22, Imperial General Headquarters decided te commence' the preparation fer the "She no. 1 Operation11 and simultaneously sent the 1st Division, the 30th Bomber Air Group and other units to the PHILIPPINES.
On October 18, the Southern Area Army commander advisee Imperial General Headquarters te put the "Sho no. 1 Operation" in action when it saw signs of enemy landings. The Imperial General Headquarters ordered -the execution of the "Sho no. 1 Operation" that very day.
Hereupon, the Southern Area Army commenced the Battle for LETTE.
2. Outline of the Progress of the Battle for LETTE
a. Ever since early October, enemy planes fiercely attacked and -annihilated our air forces in the PHILIPPINES. Approximately 500 to 1,000 planes attacked daily. ^
2. Details of the operation in the decisive battle for LETTS.
At that time, the 14th Area Army did not have tho same ideas concerning the the execution of the decisive battle for LEYTE. Namely in view of the then situation en LUZON, a certain victory on LEYTE could not be expected by throwing in men and materials; and this was not adviseable because it would reduce the strength on LUZON.
On the other hand, the plan of the Grand Imperial Headquarters concerning the execution of the LEYTE Battle was made eetremely strong. The Southern Army held the same opinion as the Grand Imperial Headquarters.
The General Army conducted the LEYTE operation strongly on the assumption that it was possible to carry out the planned reinforcement of the infantry groups on LUZON.
3. The 14th Area Army and the 4th Air Army pushed forward in the execution of the LEYTE battle with their entire strength.
At that time the 4th Air Army had about 50 to 70 usable planes. The 2nd Air Division advanced its command post to BACOLOD on the 19 th. The 30th Fighter Group also quickly advanced to BACOLOD in order to attack the enemy warships and vessels in the LEYTE Area and controlled the movements of the enemy planes.
The strength of the enemy landing in the LEYTE area on October 20 was approximately 3 divisions.
On the 21st, the 35th Army Commander detached approximately 6 battalions from the 71 SAYA and MINDANAO sectors fof diversionary activity. This unit had boen arriving at n0EM0KH since the 27th. However, the hoped for destruction of the enemy landing convoy by our air force before the commencement of operations was not achieved due to the delay in receiving information, loss "of "an" opportunity' to «^s^t-3Q*e. rk*-%r. battle,strength,^ and incliment weather. Therefore, the failure of the first phase of planned acFion'a^Wst*'^^'"1' enemy landing convoy was unavoidable. *
The air force had been arriving from the southern area since October 22; but die to the long range maneuver, the display of battle strength did not come up to expectations. Moreover, on the 24th, there were not more than 147 planes, of those which had arrived, that could be used in groups of twos and threes.
The 4th Air Army commander advanced the command post to BACOLOD on the 23rd# On the 27th, the 14th Area Army Commander placed the 1st Division, the 36th Division, and the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade under the command of the 35th Army Commander and planned to throw them into the LEYTE area.
The 1st Division entered the port of MANILA safely on the 27th and the morale was extremely high.
On October 28, the Southern Army diverted a part of the Fighter Squadron from the 3rd Air Army with the aim of protecting the Infantry Group, 1st Divieion, in the decisive battle in the LETTS area.
4. Prior to this, the Southern Army together with the 14th Area Army had examined the battle strength to be thrown into the LEYTE area; and on the 30th it was decided to throw in the following infantry groups: V
V
The 1st Division The 26th Division The 68th Independent Mixed Brigade The 2nd Independent Anti-Tank Gun Battalion
2 Tank Companies
2| Battalions of the 30th Division
3 Battalions of the 102nd Division
The 1st Division under the protection of the 4th Air Army and the Navy Air Force departed from the port of MANILA on the 31st and arrived safely in "QRMQK" on November 1.
5. At that time, the 4th Air Army planned to attack enemy warships and vessels in the LEYTE Bay area and to hinder the use of the air base with its main body. The climax of the air battles was reached about the end of October. _
The BACOLOD air bases due to poor weather, the use of a new type of plane (Type 4 fighters), and the lack of maintenance strength of the unit, greatly restricted the movements of the planes.*f the 317 planes on the airfields, there were only about 140 planes which could be used.
6. Colonel HATTORI, chief of the military operations section of the Grand Imperial Headquarters, who was in the PHILIPPINES at that time, reported on October 31 that, in his opinion, the 23rd Division must be dispatched to the PHILIPPINE Island area immediately and must be supplied with 300 landing crafts. •
j -——.-- ■......'*-"' * --.v»: *<*,:
7. The Southern Army, in view of the participation of the land Infantry :-----
group in the U5YTE area and the great losses in the air, reported on
the 30th that one to two infantry groups and 800 planes must be sent by November 6. Furthermore, it reported te the Grand Imperial Headquarters, on November 3, that it must be supplied with 80 planes per day for some time in order to succeed in it s air operations; but it received the reply that this was almost impossible.
At present, the result of the decisive battle for Leyte depends on the concentration of the battle strength in depth on UJYTE and the prevention of the enemy from reinforcing his troops. \
at that time, the enemy force landing in the LEYTE area was estimated to be five divisions. The enemy seemed to be planning an advance to the "ORMOK" plain from the "XARIGALA" area with a powerful unit.
The general observation at the end of October is as follows1
(a) The enemy planned te reinforce its own force if it discovered our own troop reinforcements. It was estimated that the enemy will push its construction of the airfield with five or six divisions.
(b) Although there may be a new plan for the MINDANAO area, there are no indications at the present time that such is the case.
(c) Thews is a fear of a war of attrition, as a result of changing to airbase destructive warfare from naval air warfare.
8. The 35th Army Eeadquarters advanced its Command Poet to "ORMOK" on November 2.
The advance of the 1st Division to "KARIKALA" area became difficult as indicated by the situation.
The plan for throwing in the infantry groups selected few the LEYTE battle in the abo^e situation was generally as follows!
The 26th Division departed from MANILA on the morning of the 6th and reached "ORMOK" on the evening of the 7th.
The 68th Independent Mixed Brigade departed from MANILA on the 8th and arrived in "ORMOK" from the 9th to the 11th. .
The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade departed from MANILA on the 17th and arrived in "CATBALOGAN" on the 20th.
The 16th Division was in a valiant battle in the LEYTE area; but considerable disorder was brought about by the surprise enemy land-- ■■ • i^v .* JThe f^spe .under..,f>he. patrol.. ofyj&e P^iyls^on^Opmmander tn the... 22nd was approximately 2500.
f * i .
The greatest loss in any one regiment up to the 27th was 85$; and tHere were only 4 guns in that regiment.
•»
9. Our combined fleet destroyed the ?. 8. fleet commanded by Admiral HALSEY which was attacking in the sea eaet of LEYTE. Under the plan to facilitate the execution of the decisive battle for LEYTE, the 1st Fleet from the SAN BERNADINO Straits, the 2nd Fleet from the "SURIGAO" Straits, and the 3rd Fleet (with carriers as a nucleus) from the sea east of LUZON Island, all advanced for the attack to the area east of LEYTE* -
Our fleet eliminated persistent enemy air and submarine attacks before reaching the area east of LEYTE, arriving at the battle area on the morning of the 25th when lt participated in the fierce battle.
At that time, the information reaching the Headquarters was considerably good and thero was a report that the enemy fleet received a great damaging blow.
Notej This report was Incorrect and the result ef the "battle was not
necessarily great. However, our losses were great and the enemy mobile force in the area west of the PHILIPPINES was then able te mete freely.
10. In view of the present situation in the LETTE area, the Southern Army reported the following on November 4:
(a) Until the completion of the decisive battle of LETTE (at the earliest, the middle of December), the supply planes will be advanced
in order to preserve the 200 usable planes of that time.
(b) About 30 speed beats will be quickly supplied, besides advancing the 100,000 total tonnage of shipping by November 15.
(c) One strategical infantry group and the 23rd Division will be advanced and the LETTE area should be strenthened by at least two picked and replenished infantry groups.
There were about 300 planes by the addition of the airplanes arriving in the PHILIPPINES by the end of October te the unit supply planes.
The 23rd Division was included in the order of battle of the 14th Area Army on November 5. It was to arrive in the PHILIPPINES on about November 25 or 26 and was to participate in the LETTE battle.
11. The Southern Army had gradually exhausted the units of the 4th Air Army and it recognized the necessity of restoring the latter,s battle strength as soon as possible.
The four fighter regiments (on November 2), and the two fighter regiments, two attack regiments, two each of ligljt and heavy bomber regi-* -...»-Jftents K(on the 8th) were to restore their battle strength in JAPAN and
were ordered-to -revuVn' to" JAriSTr
On November 8, the Southern Army asked the reinforcement of the strength of the four fighter regiments by about November 20 in order to carry out the battle of LETTE and the sending of the 200 requested planes (50 fighters of Type 4, 50 fighters of Type 1, and 100 others) by the 20th in erder to restore the strength in that area.
On the 28th, the 1st Raiding Group was included in the order of battle of the 4th Air Army. At this time, the Southern Army estimated the enemy airbases used in connection with the PHILIPPINES Operation as the following (in the LEYTE Operation, the decisive battle, waa predicted to continue for a long period):
(a) The air strength on LEYTE Island mas 300—500 planes. It was approximately 500 planes after the latter part ef November.
(b) Approximately 700 planes on the 8 airfields on MOROTAI.
(o)
Approximately 250 planes on "PELIEU".
(d) 7 to 8 airfields in the MARIANAS.
12. The Southern Army decided to transfer to SAIGON in order to direct the general operations. On November 13, the commander-in-chief summoned the Area Army commander and the air army commander and explained the following decisiont
(a) The LETTE battle will be carried on as before and the use of bases by the enemy will be em prevented at all times.
(b) Ths armament8 on LUZON Island will be sufficiently strengthened so that it will not obstruct the execution of the LETTE battle.
(c) Other areas will not be abandoned immediately.
The commander-in-chief departed fmom MANILA on the 17th and transferred to SAIGON.
13. There was a report that the U.S. 6th Army commander had arrived in NTAKUROBANrt on the 19th. At that time, the mobile unit at its advance base of URUSHI carried out a very skillful recurrent attack. ^
After the LETTE landing, the mem number of planes which came to attack the PHILIPPINES up to November 20 was 7426 (including 4183 carrier planes).
14. The amount of men and supply on I2STTE Island about the end of November was 48,000 men| 600 horses and 210 vehicles; a continuous daily prevision of 6,000 kiloliters was required.
During the ^ame period, the supplying of war materials in the LETTE area with small vessels became very difficult due to the activity • - ^sf.-thc*:c»fwyaii~»fsrce •■s^-*oi^rde_beAt«s>-/
During. November, the percentage of the 26,600 men and 14,200 tons (include e 5000 tons for units) of munitions transported to and actually reaching LEYTE was 45$.
15. The battle strength of the 1st Division gradually decreased. As soon as the advance to the "TAKUROBAN" plains from the "EARIKARA" area became difficult, it decided to advance in the direction of "BULADEN" with the 26th Division. With the very close support of the 14th Area Army and the 4th Air Army, it decided on a plan to recapture the "BULAU-EN" airfield. ,
On December 3, it decided to start this operation on the 6th. It temporarily recaptured the HBULAUENM airfield; but, due to the bad roads and weather, reinforcements and supply were cut off.
Moreover, due to the enemy counter-landing in the "ORMOK11 area, this
operation waa necessarily suspended. The Area Army planned to make a strong counter-landing in "KARIKARA" Bay with a part of the force. The date of this move was designated as December 16 and preparations were being made; but, in view of the general situation in the LETTS area, the preparations were not completed and the move was not executed,
16. The special attack unit arrived in stages in the PHILIPPINES since'the early part ef November and obtained excellent results against the enemy fleet in the LETTE area; but it could net change the war situation. The enemy advanced its base te MINDORO in the early part of December, and our air operation became more and more restricted. Moreover, the arrival of supply planes waa also interrupted. Since December our air force was forced into hiding.
17. In view of the war situation in the LETTE area, the Southern Army dispatched Ohief of Staff IIMUBA to MANILA in the middle of December. He communicated with the Chief of Operations of the Grand Imperial Headquarters who was there at that time and who was responsible for the direction of the operations in the LEYTE area.
At that time the southern Army maintained its former minimum battle strength. If it could not obtain the control of the PHILIPPINES waters it concluded that the LETTE operation would be unsuccessful. The enemy firmly established its basic position for capturing LUZON by capturing the VISATAN sector air bases. After the complete interruption of our southern communications, the enemy would probably attack LUZON; .and the Area Army estimated that the time of attack would be the middle of January. The Area Army concluded that the continuation of the LETTE battle would be disadvantageous to subsequent operations and thus suspended it on November 14. The Area Army ordered the 35th Army to continue its resistance alone and the 30th Division Commander, under a chain of command^ to resist alone in the MINDANAO area.
At that time, the Southern Army was strongly in favor of continuing'the7**"" LETTE battle; but the report after the return of Chief of Staff IIMUBA -mfedor'Ctear • €2at*thc- ure^'ltaey*- ifiuS •a^i'Wtdy^givWi'-'tiptt~&mliiL&*~~*~ ing the battle. The Area Army was then given charge of its own actions.
During this period, the 19th Division was sent to the PHILIPPINES. Furthermore, the 10th Division arrived in LUZON in the period from December 20 to the end of the month.
Paragraph 5 Situation in the BURMA Area
1. The BURMA Area Army fought desperately in the IMPHAL sector; but, since it encountered strong enemy resistance and difficulty in supply and replacement, it had to suspend the "IMPHAL" battle in July 1944.
The power of each unit decreased considerably; but their strength was quickly restored to prepare for the next phase of operations.
The BURMA Area Army was carrying out a withdrawal operation facing the the banks of the IRRAWADDT River. However, on September 19 the Southern
Army in the BURMA area firmly secured the important areas of southern - BURMA and formed a strong point in the north wing of the southern arc. During this period it received orders from the Grand Imperial Headquarters to "block communication with INDIA as much as possible. It also changed the duty of the BURMA AREA ARMY.
2. Subsequently the retreat by the 15th Army towards the bank of the IRRA-WADDY River was able to avoid the enemy's rapid pursuit and was carried out rather smoothly. It wae able to maintain the expected conditions of the end of 1944. The fighting strength of the group was greatly decreased due to the long period of operation; its effective strength was approximately one division of 4,000 men.
Therefore, the rapid recovery of the fighting strength was necessary. 7or that reason, the Southern Army'first placed the 49th Division and the 53rd Division under the BURMA Area Army, and the same time, threw in replacements to restore to bring it up to fighting strength.
3. Situation in the various areas.
(a) In the northern BURMA sector, the 33rd Army was fighting vigorously against the superior enemy force and was trying to cut the communications between INDIA and CHINA; but the enemy has increased its forces. The 33rd Army at the end of the year, was holding NANKAN and MONMIT securely.
(b) In the northwest sector of BURMA, the 15th Army consolidated its position on the left bank of the IRRAWADDY River; but its fighting strength has been greatly reduced. Judging from the situation at that time, they were expedted to be able to stop the rush of the enemy only temporarily.
(c) On. the southwest coast, the 28th Army was-fighting satisfactorily,, and there was no important change.
";j£heV''3ri MrV&oe cldiS^^oope^ate'd'in "the BURMA Speratisn^v^^ts # 5th Air Division and facilitated the operation by good fighting with*
• a small force.
Paragraph 6 War Situation in the Areas of Northern AUSTRALIA and NEW GUINEA
1. The 18th Army was put under the command of the Southern Army in the middle of November, but since the early summer of 1944, supplies were completely cut off and so it tried to effectuate a strategic stalemate.
The Southern Army, fearing the interruption of communication between the 18th Army and itself, succeeded in transporting communication materials by air by taking advantage of the darkness of an October night.
2,
The North Australia Area
(a) The Second Area Army, upon discovering the enemy landing on BIAK Island, endeavored to annihilate this force by any and all means, but in vain (details were previously stated). Furthermore, the Second Area Army planned the destruction of the enemy which had attacked MOROTAI and continued the operation on tjie island under considerable difficulties. However, the plan could not be accomplished due to the lack of ships. The 7th Air Sftjjem-oVrt with a small force, cooperated ink the operation' several times and obtained excellent results.
In the early part of October, the Southern Army in order to complete the LETTE operations and in view of the necessity of controlling the enemy air bases located on MOROTAI, transferred a part of the air unit which had been in PALEMHANG to blockade the movements of the enemy and took action to speed the decisive fight in the PHILIPPINES AREA,
(b) -Accompanying the enemy attack on MOROTAI, the 2nd Area Army thought that enemy attack against HALMAHERA, and the northern CELEBES area was approaching and transferred its command post to MAKASSAR to direct the general operations, as well as strengthening its preparations for the battle.
(c) Upon the enemy attack in the PHILIPPINES area, the 2nd Area Army " captured the MAL airfield and prepared to attack SAN SAHORE with the purpose of obstructing and controlling the enemy's rear.
Paragraph 7 Situation in the Other Areas
1. Southwest Area
In the southwest area, furious preparations were being made to meet an enemy*attack against the ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands and northern. SUMATRA. This attack may be carried out in conjunction with the attack of the MGI^2N^IAir-"te£wp* -in the..S6S&U**e** > , ..
Furthermore, the Army was organizing the 94th Division to strengthen' the war preparations in northern MALAYA, especially the cervical region. This was completed on October 14 and it was included in the battle order of the 29th Army.
2. Borneo Area
In the BORNEO area as previously stated, disposition for the change in distribution was carried out in order to take immediate action against the enemy's plan to penetrate thru the SULU Sea; and the west coast and northern BORNEO were strengthened.
Chapter 6 The Sustained Combat Operation from January 194$ to May 194$5~
1*
Paragraph 1 Principles
The decisive battle of the PHILIPPINES was not carried out according to plan in which all combat was to be executed by staking everything the Army's could muster; and the situation of the Southern Army was greatly changed. It now requires further operating orders for the purpose of facilitating the Army's operation against the enemy who would advance to the area of JAPAN Proper.
The Southern Army received the following order from the Grand Imperial Headquarters at the end of January and drew up an operational plan.
The Gist of the Order
The commander-in-chief of the Southern Army.will destroy tho attacking enemy and securely hold the important sectors to check the enemy advance towards JAPAN Proper or CHINA and ease the operation of the whole army. The Summary of the order is as follows!
(1) In the PHILIPPINES area, the important points in LUZON \ must be held securely and it must endeavor to destroy the attacking enemy.
(2) The important sectors in INDO-CHINA, THAILAND, MALAYA and SUMATRA should be held securely because these regions are the pivots of the southern area.
(3) In the areas other than those mentioned in the previous two items, the army, from the viewpoint of politics and strategy,- must endeavor to hold securely the important areas, especially the districts containing important materials and important bases which the enemy is planning to
reCaptUre. ry*mynmmmmmr^mr r.^^^.
*T4"f" The'aggreslive'' destruct ioi*.'©i>.-uhfr-an'osy*?- fighting, strength,, is planned for every place.
(5) It will menace and disrupt the supply lines in the enemy's rear as much as possible in the areas near the sea and the continent.
(6) The various plans are especially adaptable to the situations for stopping important sea communications.
(7) The Army will endeavor to carry out the various military administrative plans adaptable to the war situatbn, and will also publicize JAPAN's true intentions to the various South Sea Natives.
The Southern Army planned to send the important materials to the homeland by penetrating the communication route which it was cutting to the best of*its ability as well as endeavoring to maintain the
IL
security in the center of the important areas; hut, due to /the fierce counter-attack of the English-Indian Army towards the BURMA area after April, the important areas of central and southern BURMA fell into enemy hands.
Paragraph 2 Drafting of the Operational Plans Accompanying the Failure in the Decisive Battle of the PHILIPPINES
As soon as the no. 1 operation failed in the end of 1944, the Southern Army "began to map out the fperational plan for the first half of 1945. '
At that tims, there was as yet no change in duty for the Southern Army by the Grand Imperial Headquarters. Therefore, the Southern Army drew up a draft of the operation plan during the middle of January 1945, based on the following estimate of the situation. The Ohief of Staff NUMADA was ordered to present a report in TOXW at the end of January.
Lt. General NUMADA received the Grand Imperial Headquarters Order and returned to SAIGON at the beginning of February. In the middle of February, he called a meeting of the chiefs of staff and secretly explained the outline of the operational plan as well as issuing the necessary orders. v-
On February 5, the 10th Area Fleet and the 4th Southern Task Force were placed under the commander-in-chief of the Southern Army. Therefore, the long pending problem of a unified command of the Army and Navy was finally effectuated.
Notes: Summary of the estimate of the situation by the Southern Army
1.* Summary of the general estimate of situation ■■ww'nn-n'-w- •■ f- ..
■ {&} Ifif-tha eastern frontal arso* the UV-S. Ar^.planned^th.e..4acpptiif . up of the entire PHILIPPINE Islands, in view of the'island's political and strategical value, to make it the subsequent base of operations. After this, it was not known that the U. S. forces would advance to TAIWAN and the South Seas Islands to plan for the attack of JAPAN Proper or capture a base towards CHINA, or if they would land on the southeast coast of CHINA or the eastern coast of French INDO-CHINA, especially HAINAN Island in a decisive move for the maintenance of communication with CHINA. However, the date of the operation was estimated to be after the spring of 1944.
In regards to the plan for the cooperation in the capture of SINGAPORE with the BRITISH Army by the U. S. Army which advanced to the SINGAPORE area from BORNEO, it was thought that they would not adopt such a plan from the standpoint of English policy; and the English forces would help only in the BORNEO area with the AUSTRALIAN force.
(b) In the eastern frontal area, the BRITISH-INDIAN Army after our defeat in the IMPHAL operations successively advanced southward and planned for the capture of southern BURMA.
Although the fighting strength had decreased considerably and the BURMA Area Army had generally completed the adjustment of its positions on the banks of the IRRAWADDY River by the end of 1944, lt was thought possible to held this line securely till the rainy season if this fighting strength was quickly increased, i
However, lt wae estimated that the time for the breaking of the southern circle after the capture of ANDAMAN, NIKOVAL, and the cervical region of MALAY would be after June.
It was extremely desirable to map up the CHINA area as quickly as possible, since there was great fear that the Greater East Asia defense circle would be cut in the north and south if the PRILLIPPINE Islands were captured. Eepcially the cutting of the communications with the homeland during the enemy's advance to tho CHINA area would bo inimical to the safety of the Southern \ Army. The Grand Imperial Headquarters planned on the mutual cooperation between the CHINA Task force and the Southern Army to carry out the operation toward the SUMMING and CHUNGKING areas. Moreover, since there was a great significance in this operation to delay the enemy's attack on the homeland, the Southern Army regarded this as important and also studied it carefully.
(c) The Southern Army, basing its action on the above estimation, quickly strengthened its positions on the INDO-CHINA Peninsula as well as quickly strengthening the positions in the cervical region of MALAY on the western front. The southern Army estimated that there was a necessity for facilitating the operation of the entire Army by checking the advance of the enemy towards CHINA or the homeland by destroying the attacking enemy.
It was not expected'that the Southern Army would be abie^-fo""'comp-letely hold the entire southern circle by itself if the PHILIPPINES were captured. The Southern Army reached the decision that lt waa very important to hold SINGAPORE, SAIGON, BANGKOK, and HANOI, and the supply points connecting these areas.
2. Estimate of the Situation in Each Area
(a) The PHILIPPINES area
In the LUZON area, it was hoped that the battle would be carried out to the very last man and that as many of the enemy as possible would be killed; because in the situation, we expected the rapid increase in enemy strength and also increasing difficulties in air operations and troop replacement.
(b) The BURMA area .
The BURMA Area Army, since the suspension of the IMPHAL operation in July of the previous year* had taken steps toward a new disposition which progressed smoothly; and it was able to hold the expected positions securely at the end of 1944. However, the strength of the infantry group has been greatly reduced by the long period of operations. In the 15th Army, the effective strength of a division was approximately 4,000 men.
Moreover, the strength was greatly reduced by the transfer of the 2nd Divieion in order to strengthen the defense preparations on the INDO-CHINA peninsula. However, if the strength had been increased and adjusted, the firm hold on the bank of the IRRAWADDY River till the beginning of the rainy season would have been possible.
Situation in each area of BURMA
A. In the northern front, the 33rd Army was fighting bravely against a very superior enemy; but the cutting off of the INDIA-BURMA route had aeon become very difficult, and the only hope was the hindrance of transportation.
B. In the northwestern front, the 15th Army had transferred te the vicinity of MANDALAY; and the left bank of the IRRAWADDY River with its main force; but Its strength had been greatly reduced. In view of the situation, its strength was limited, to temporarily checking the enemy rush. When the strength was increased and restored, it was expected to securely hold the line at the beginning of the rainy season.
C. In the southwestern coast area the 28th Army was fighting satisfactorily; and there no obstruction was expected in carrying out the next plan of operations.
3. North AUSTRALIA arid NEW 5'uiNEA Areas '
a
There was a necessity of strategically assigning a permanent duty to the north AUSTRALIA sector, which dftL not have to be commanded during . sthe height of the PHILIPPINES operation.
There was expected to be no immediate enemy attack in the North AUSTRALIA area, JAVA and the LESSER SUNDA Archipelago; and it was thought very appropriate to immediately transfer this strength to the central sector in the southern circle.
4. The BORNEO Area
In regards to the enemy plan to break through from the SULU sea area, the policy was to firmly hold the important areas of North BORNEO; but in view of the change in the war situation in the PHILIPPINES area, it was necessary to limit the areas to be held to the sector surrounding BRUNEI in western BORNEO and to the southern BORNEO sector. However, the change in disposition of the Infantry groups would take considerable time, and there would be many difficulties in transporting,
guarding, moving on land. If the enemy attack towards SINGAPORE were rapid, there would he a great probability that they would take advantage of our incompleted change in disposition.
5. The INDIAN Ocean Area
In preparation for the enemy attack, the defenses on ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands and the northern SUMATRA sector were generally completed, but the main force of the 4th Division had been recently transferred to the FRENCH INDO-CHINA peninsula from SUMATRA; and the strength was probably unintentionally weakened.
There was a necessity of immediately strengthening the defenses in the cervical area of the MALAYS; since it was estimated that the enemy would make a decisive counter-attack on MALAYA by crossing the INDIAN Ocean or from the BURMA area.
6. The FRENCH INDO-CHINA Area
FRENCH INDO-CHINA was the eastern defense wall since the loss of the PHILIPPINES; and its operational value had greatly increased as a base of operations, since it faces the CHINA area. Therefore it had become neceasary to strengthen the preparations for battle.
7. 'The THAILAND Area
In connection with the change in the situation, especially the change in the BURMA battle lines due to the enemy attacks in the FRENCH INDOCHINA area and the MALAY area (cervical region), it had become most important to improve the cooperation between THAILAND and JAPAN. For that reason, it was necessary to strengthen the vicinity of BANGKOK as the pivot of the INDO-CHINA peninsula.
8. The 3rd Air Army . .
The strength of the' 3rd-Air*Army had^reaiily decreased since the main force of the Fighter Unit had been transferred to fne' PHI*ilPPINE-"Islands; for the recent 7 operations took over its various missions with a very small force; in addition, it had. to complete the important duties of training essential air personnel for the whole National Army.
Accompanying the gradual destruction of the 4th Air Army in the PHILIPPINES area, its operational area was extended; and it had to do its utmost to send raw materials back to the homeland.
Air operations were thereafter limited to very important and indispensable missions. Therefore the land unit encountered difficulties from lack of air support; and could expect only to carry out land operations without the cooperation of the air force.
Paragraph 3 War Situation in the PHILIPPINES Area
1* The 14th Area Army ordered the 35th Army te carry out stalemate resistance by itself after the decisive battle fer LETTE, It also sent troops to obstruct the enemy's plans by holding the airbases of BACOLOD, CA&A-TAN, and DAYAO in the central and southern PHILIPPINES. Its headquarters was moved to BAGIO on December 25, and the PHILIPPINE Government also moved to BAGIO on the same day. i
The Area Army resisted as long as possible by exploiting the terrain in the LUZON sector, since the complete hold on the MANILA and CLARK sector would have been difficult against the superior enemy. It tried to facilitate the general operation of the National Army by restricting the actions of as many of the enemy as possible.
After the suspension of the LETTE operation, the Southern Army on Jan. 1, 1945 placed the 4th Air Army under the command of the 14th Area Army Commander, because it would have been disadvantageous to ahve separate commanders using our strength for the LUZON operation.
The Area Army Commander moved the Air Army to ECHAK on January 7.
2. The enemy landed on LINGAYEN BAT ON January 9.
The 4th Air Army attacked the enemy warships and vessels between the 10th and the 14th with its entire LUZON air strength.
The enemy started using the LINGAYEN airfield on the 15th. The 14th Area Army estimated that the enemy would suddenly advance to the CLANK area in a decisive move by penetrating our positions with reinforcement after first capturing bridgeheads in SAN FABIAN with its main body and in LINGAYEN and the western sector with another, party.
The Southern Army several times ordered the 14th Area Army to block this - plan-by •destroying the sues/'an the beach, taking advantage s^his uncompleted bridgehead.
The Grand Imperial Headquarters also directed this operation. The Area Army made preparations to carry it out, but due to the total air supremacy and the superior armored force of the enemy, its large-scale execution was difficult.
3. Furthermore, the 14th Area Army endeavored to carry out the plan for restricting and controlling the U. S. Army over a long period by trying every possible means to destroy and decrease the enemy strength and by securely maintAining the sector surrounding BAGIO WITH its main body (the 10th, 19th, and 23rd Divisions and the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade), sector west of CLARK (with 30,000 men commanded by the Raiding Group commander, and the sector east of MANILA (with- the 8th Division) with parts.of the unit.
3'
Munitions are extremely important for the execution of an operation. Although it was planned to transfer the munitions depot from the MANILA sector to the northern LUZON sector immediately after the battle of LEYTE, it became increasingly difficult after the enemy landing on LINGAYEN on January 9.
The designated plan was only half completed. In order to increase its strength, the Southern Army frantically tried getting supplies by means of ships and air transportation; but this was almost impossible because of enemy air and submarine operations.
4. It was estimated that the enemy strength landed at tho end of January was 8 divisions in the LINGAYEN area and 2 divisions in the frontal area of SUBIC Bay. The enemy planes sent to the PHILIPPINE Islands area were estimated to number 800 to 900.
A part of the enemy which landed in the LINGAYEN area penetrated to the MANILA area and entered one eection on February 3. The enemy strength in the LINGAYEN area increased to 13 divisions by February 6. In the MANILA area, it captured the city of MANILA and crossed the PASIG Elver.
The Area Army then decided to conduct guerilla operations by firmly maintaining three strong points. Its general activities at the end of January were confined to raiding and infiltration operations with a small force. It decided to strengthen these within the middle of February. At the same time, the 14th Area Army estimates the enemy eituation in the PHILIPPINES area as follows l
In early March, the enemy strength used in attacking the strong point in Eastern MANILA were 6-7 divisions; 2 divisions attacking the strong point west of CLARK and 5-6 divisions in the capture of LUZON. The capture of northern LUZON was coordinated with the landing in the APARI area. It was thought that the enemy would use a Paratroop Unit- in ECHSKEThe. loose a of. .the. laftd -uni t ^in the LUZON area up to the end of February were as follows:
Killed and wounded" 12591
Larger guns than the rapid firing gun 140
All kinds of tanks and vehicles 750 *
5. In the LEYTE area, the 35th Army decided on a plan to fight by itself and to minimize the enemy action byy guerilla warfare in the sector west of LEYTE and in the VISAYA seceer. It disposed all units for diversion but it was estimated that this would require 3 months.
In the same area, the strength under the control of the army commander was approximately 15,000 at the end of January. The Axmjr Headquarters arrived at TAHOGON on CEBU Island on March 18 and then moved to MINDANAO on April 11.
6. After its transfer to EGHAKE, the 4th Air ARmy found it increasingly difficult to' oonduct air operations. Its air strength was very small when MANILA and CLARE fell into enemy hands. The air force changed to land operations as well as transferring to TAIWAN for subsequent operations and for the recovery of its strength. There were about 80 planes and 120 men arriving in TAIWAN on February 11.
In view of this situation ef the 4th Air Army, an order for the return of the 4th Air Army Headquarters was issued at the end of February. The 2nd and the 7th Air division were placed under the conrand of the 3rd Air Army and the 4th Air Division, under the command of the 14th Area Army. The air force was transferred to the homeland and other areas, mainly for the next phase of operations.
The 2nd Air Division was mainly responsible for strengthening the position of land defense in BACOLOD; but the Southern Army reported to the Grand Imperial Headquarters that the division must be transferred to strengthen FRENCH INDO-CHINA. The Grand Imperial Headquarters did not approve.
The 3rd Air Army issued an order to the division to return during' the division1s transfer to SINGAPORE in accordance with the change in command to the 3rd Air Army.
?. Ia March, the situation in each area became extremely fierce, especially in the strong point east of MANILA. The 41st Army was newly organized on March 30 by uniting the 8th Division and teefc ether units in the same area. ^
In April, the losses of the 1st line were great. Moreover our strength decreased daily due only to difficulyy in supply and to the increased activity of bandits.
The Area Army Headquarters was transferred to BAMBAN on April 19, and the command post was transferred to, GTAGAN after May 16.
Liaison with the PHILIPPINE Island increased after the middle of June.*
8. The enemy attacking the MINDANAO area was about 3 Divisions. It advanced _to DAY AO.
aragraph 4 The situation in the BURMA Area
1. In the northwestern sector of BURMA, the 15th Army planned to recover its fighting strength and prepared for the next phase of operations. However, the enemy stormed to the vicinity of MANDALAY and the IRRAWADDY River bank.
Therefore, the area army opened the IRRAWADDY campaign on January 17 and planned to destroy the enemy who was attacking in various places.
The Area Army placed the 53rd Division under the command of the 15th Army to increase the strength in that area*
In the middle of February, the enemy strength was 6 Divisions. The army fought valiantly to destroy the enemy by taking advantage of the enemy river crossing from the MINBU area. A
2. In the northern BURMA sector, the 33rd Army counter-attacked the superior enemy who was penetrating at various places. It always gained successful results; but in the, middle of February, the enemy expeditionary force was increased to 11 divisions. The 56th Division advanced to LA SOTO with its main body and the. 18th Division destroyed about 1 brigade after the fierce battle in the "MITOSON" vicinity.
3. In the southwest coastal area, a part of the enemy force started landing at AKTAB on December 31 of last year and on RAMHEE Island on January 21.
The 28th Army turned back the sharp attack of the enemy by fierce fighting in various places.
4. During this period, the 5th Air Division cooperated in the operations of each area several times with a small force. It obtained especially great results in the attacks against enemy convoys in the AKTAB-RAMREE
Island area.
5. The southern Army sent the 2nd Division from the BURMA area in order to strengthen the positions on the INDO-CHINA Peninsula at the end of January; but in view of the situation in the MANDALAT area, the withdrawal of units other than one regiment and the division Headquarters were unavoidably delayed.
6. In March, the enemy on the bank of the IRRAWADDT River suddenly became active; and when it became obvious that the enemy would advance.southward across the river, the BURMA area army decided to annihilate them
, on the^bank of the IRRAWADDT River by a sudden move. Therefore,, with the oooperation of the three armies, it carrieu"out* the ^asir* deration11. At the end of March, a meeting of all chiefs-of-staff was held at MBKTICA; and the plan of the Area Army was presented. "?
Lt. Gen. HUMAIA, the chief of staff who had attended the meeting, returned to SAIGON and reported that the fighting spirit of the area army was high and that they were certain of victory. That is, one division of the 33rd Army was ordered to cover the rear flank against the enemy crossing from the sector north of MANDALAT. The main body of the 15th Army was attacking the enemy from the rear by aggressively crossing ths river from the direction of MANDALAT. During this period, the entire strength of the 28th Army was cooperating in the attack of the main body from the direction of "ENANJONG". J> i
Although each army was steadily preparing for the major engagement, we could net open this engagement since the powerful enemy armored force which had advanced to MEKTILA at the beginning of April by crossing
the IRRAWADDT River was pressing the rear of the maind body of the Area Army.
7. The Area Army subsequently planned to destroy the enemy advancing in the direction of MEKTILA; but lt could not destroy the enemy which relied upon supply from tho air. It finally retreated and readjusted its bat- -tie lines.
Prior-to—tR4«, on March 23, the strength of the National Army of BURMA was 8000. At that time, a part of the force was required to cftell uprisings in various places.
In view of the situation in the INDO-CHINA Peninsula and the MALAY area, the Southern Army changed the duty of the BURMA area army on April 7. tfhe holding of tho important areas surroungind RANGOON, TOUNGOO, and ROICO was assigned to it. •
8. The enemy which was advancing towards MANDALAY and MEIKTILA planned to • advance southward along the MANDALAY highway and press on towards
RANGOON in a decieive action.
The Area Army in order to facilitate the adjusting of battle lines of the main body and to check the enemy advance, ordered the 49th Division and other forces withdrawn from the 28th Army area to advance northward to deal with the situation; but it could not check the enemy advance. The BNANJONG oil fields area fell into onemy hands on April 22.
The 105th Brigade in RANGOON quickly advanced northward towards PEGU and prepared for the enemy advance southward. A part of the enemy made a surprise landing on the mouth of the RANGOON River on May 2 and finally captured RANGOON on the 3rd. At that time, there was no unit stationed in RANGOON to defend it; and the Area Army headquarters moved to MOULMEIN on the 2nd.
Therefore the Area Army decided to concentrate the main force in the seceer west of the SITTANG River which extends from the vicinity of MOUIMEIN to the vicinity of SITTANG. It- disposed the troops accordingly. The effective strength of the BURMA area army around the end of October was about as follows:
15th Army 9000 men 13 cannons
33rd Army m 3900 men 3 cannons
28th Army 16000 men 40 cannons
Ammunition for J- of a battle
Rations for 2 months
Fuel for 1 month Medical Supplies for 1 month •
Paragraph 5 Situation in the Northern AUSTRALIA and NEW GUINEA Area
1. In the NEW/GUINEA Area, a part of the enemy carried out a strong landing at "BUTSU" on March 17; and the 20th Division fiercely battled the enemy.
The northern AUSTRALIA area was then strategically a stalemate zone. The forces were to he withdrawn as much as possible and the positions in the vicinity of SINGAPORE be strengthened; at the same time, the immediate necessity of reorganizing the command system of the north AUSTRALIAN area had increased. These points were studied.
(1) Withdrawal of forces in the North Australia area.
In order to strengthen the positions in the SINGAPORE area, it was decided that a large force would be withdrawn and transferred from the North AUSTRALIA area. The plan was formulated in March, and the necessary orders were issued.
Approximately 21,000 men were to be withdrawn by the end of 1945.
For this purpose, the army-navy units in the OERAM sector and the CELEBES air sector unit were given first priority in view of the supply situation andoJhe degree of preparedness. Meanwhile, the units in the njfiS"% KAI, and TANIMBAR areas were to be concentrated in the OERAM sector at the first opportunity, and be subsequently transferred.to the JAVA area.
Although this plan was carried out with the cooperation of the Army and Navy, when opportunities presented themselves, and satisfactory results were obtained, it could not be carried out as planned due to the unrestricted activities of enemy planes and submarines.
2. Reorganization of the command system in the NORTH AUSTRALIA Area
A reorganization in the command system was necessary due to the change in the operational positions in the North AUSTRALIA area. A study was made, of the plan making JAVA the center of the uomoigl BORNEO and North AUSTRALIA area,' by transferring the 2nd Area Army to JAVA and leaving •'''•^^c^temy*^ abandoned in view of the re-
"avionehip with the past command. ' It "was*suitable to returiyBORNEO to 1 ihe 7th Area Army, since it was part of the defense circle with SINGA-PORE as the center. There would be only one army in North AUSTRALIA and the others were to be returned.
The 2nd Army headquarters was first transferred to AMBON from KQCAS, . and the 19th Army Headquarters was returned at the end of February. The 2nd Army was again transferred to MAKASSAR and the 2nd Area Army Headquarters was returned.
In connection with the above, the 48th Division was placed under the command of the 7th Area Army on May 3?.; and its operational 'zone was included in that of the area army.
Paragraph 6 Situation in the BORNEO Area
1. In the BORNEO area, as mentioned previously, its change in disposition was being rushed; but it was not progressing as expected. Moreover, t%L
it was extremely difficult to carry heavy weapons over the "bad road. The situation was such that many of the weapons had to be left in" that area. Therefore, the strength also decreased considerably with the change in disposition.
2. In April, the activity of the AUSTRALIAN Army was shown, and a part of the enemy landed at TARAKAN on April 30. The enemy plan to recapture SINGAPORE by the the capture of the important area of BORNEO became more clear.
Paragraph 7 Situation in the Southwest Area
1. The SINGAPORE area had been weak in strength and lacked supplies, especially rations. Therefore it was necessary to construct positions to prepare for the enemy plan to cut the southern circle into north and south, by immediately throwing in the necessary force and rations.
2. The 46th Division was transferred from the north AUSTRALIA area in January to strengthen the positions in the sector surrounding SINGAPORE. The Area Army also withdrew a part of the s>rce from the SUMATRA sector primarily to strengthen the positions around SINGAPORE Island.
In the middle of April, the SINGAPORE defense unit was organized/; and the positions on the island were strengthened.
Furthermore, the Southern Army after further control of FRENCH INDO-CHINA by military forces, sent the 70th Independent Mixed Brigade to MALAYA and placed it under the command of the 7th Area Army commander.
3. The Area Army then planned to reinforce the preparations on SINGAPORE Island by mustering the Japanese in that area and the personnel withdrawn from the North AUSTRALIA area. In May, it planned to transfer a force (about 2 Battalions) from ANDAMAN and NICOBAR with- naval ships
v*V*fch" tlse closj?, cooperation of the Navy and the Air Force; but this action was detected by tne enemyi and the cruisers—^ASHIGARA and HAGURO were lost. Thus, the'plan ended in failure. -
Paragraph 8 Situation in the THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA area
1. The operational position in the THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA sector had rapidly improved since the failure of the V no. 1 operation. The Southern Army since November of the previous year had carried out many studies on the preparations for the control of FRENCH INDO-CHINA by military forces to prepare for any unexpected move.
2. In the middle of January, the Southern Army diverted the 2nd and the 4th Divisions from BURMA and SUMATRA to THAILAND to reinforce the positions on the INDO-CHINA peninsula and also to strengthen the forces for control of FRENCH INDO-CHINA by military forces which had beed predicted as a result of the present situation. The 2nd Division was then
transferred to FRENCH INDO-CHINA.
The Grand Imperial Headquarters ordered the 37th Division and then the 22nd Division to advance to the North FRENCH INDO-CHINA from the CHINA area at the end of January. They arrived separately "by the end of Febru- "\ ary. The preparation for the military control of FRENCH INDO-CHINA was progressing steadily.
3. An order concerning the military control of FRENCH INDO-CHINA was issued on February 28 when it was expected that the enemy attack was approaching. The Southern Army assumed this control on March 9, and it was carried
out very smoothly.
The objective in the filst phase was achieved on March 10 in Central and Southern FRENCH INDO-CHINA. In the-,northern sector, the enemy defended a part of a fortification, but this was finally captured.
During this period, there was me special change in THAILAND.
4. The military control of FRENCH INDO-CHINA generally completed the campaign by the middle of May, but the situation in the BURMA area was rapidly growing worse; so that at the end of April, the 70th Independent Mixed Brigade was diverted to MALAY, the 22nd Division from the tforth FRENCH INDO-CHINA sector to BANGKOK, and the 37th Division immediately to BANGKOK.
The 39th Army decided to transfer the 4th Division to the North THAILAND sector, because of this situation.
Note; The increase of preparations on the INDO-CHINA Peninsula.
The war preparations on the INDO-CHINA peninsula had been diligently speeded up, since the beginning of the year; and the military control of FRENCH INDO-CHINA which was started on March 9 " was e*ejp*e*pr^ to. tJie BURMA t (
-operation'and the transportation of important materials \o the homeland, preparation did not progress as planned. THAILAND has natural features which enabled it to be used as a rear base for the BURMA area; but the war preparations were not begun.
Therefore it was necessary to send the forces of the FRENCH INDOCHINA sector to the THAILAND sector and the unit which has been weakened was transferred to THAILAND to recover its strength.
That is, the 37th Division was immediately ordered to concentrate in BANGKOK. The 22nd Division was placed under the command of of the 39th Army in May; and then.the 15th Army Headquarters and the 15th Division were transferred from the BURMA area and placed under the command of the 39th Army in June. A plan had to be formed to strengthen the positions in the vicinity of BANGKOK and in the North THAILAND sector.
Paragraph 9 Sending Important Materials to the Homeland.
On January 20, 1944 the Southern Army received the Grand Imperial Hoadquartere instruction concerning fuel and the fastest methods of transportation of important materials.
The commander-in-chief of the Southern Army strengthened the transport guard with 3 fighter regiments and an Air Training Unit.
i
Number one priority was givsn to aviation gasoline among the resources which were sent to the homeland. It was planned to send 120,000 kiloliters to JAPAN during January and February. The Southern Army earnestly endeavored to fulfill this quota; but due to the great losses in shipping from increased enemy air and submarine activity, only about half of this total was transported.
CHAPTER 7 The Sustained operation between the period of June 1945 to the conclusion of the war
N '
Paragraph 1 Revision of the operational plan of the Southern Army after the capture of BURMA
1. Plan
In the past, BURMA had been regarded as the north wing strong point in the defenss of the southern circle. Especially, after the failure of the V operation, its position had improved considerably for the preservation of the organic connection between the north and the south in the southern circle.
Consequently, the capture of BURMA seriously affected the subsequent tactical command of the Southern Army. It now lost the position of being the north wing strong point, in the Southern circle and was changed to become ihea^ahce p'oint of*the INEO-CHEJA -peninsula.
The Southern Army then decided on the operational plan for the final half of 1945. A meeting of all chiefs of staff of the Area Armies was called in the latter part of May. The outline of the operational plan was shown and the necessary orders were issued.
In view of the prospects of the future operation as well as the drafting of the operational plans, the Southern Army decided on the operational (battle) regulations with an eye to the total enemy air supremacy and superior ammored force. This was made the basis for training operations, and combat. Furthermore, It drew up and presented the plan to gradually rebuild the disorganized forces for fierce operations in all the former areas.
2. Estimate of the situation
(a) In the eastern frontal area the enemy attacked the OKINAWA area on April 1. It became more clear that the main attack of the enemy was towards the east coastal area of CHINA or to JAPAN IN ^
in a decisive move. The enemy was trying to cut off communications "between JAPAN AND THE southern circle. Consequently, the operation towards the interior of CHINA to cooperate with the CHINA expeditionary force whose preparations were being studied by the Southern Army was abandoned. The southern army had to quickly complete its preparations for sustained resistance by its own actions only.
(b) In the BORNEO area, the strategic regions of Northern BORNEO all fill into the hand of the AUSTRALIAN Army. The plan to recapture SINGAPORE by the cooperation of ENGLISH-INDIAN and AUSTRALIAN troops became clearer. It was estimated that the time would be after early autumn of that year.
(c) In the west frontal area, the position of the area army completely collapsed after the capture of RANGOON in the early part of May. It was thought that the ENGLISH-INDIAN army would attack towards the cervical region of MALAYA and that the penetration of the THAILAND area would take place shortly.
(d) The transfer of men from ths EUROPEAN Area after the collapse, of GERMANY on May 1945 was expected to take place, and the enemy air force was being reinforced in the INBIA area.
(e) Baaed on the above estimation, the Southern Army strengthened its \ positions in the INDO-CHINA Peninsula and the strategical area surrounding . SINGAPORE in order to destroy the attacking enemy; and, since this contributed
to the general operation ofbur armies, it was made the basic of tactical command.
Paragraph 2. .Situation in the INDO-CHINA Peninsula (Including BURMA) area.
1. In view of the general situation the southern army advanced its command post to DALOT on 5 June, as well as predicting future changes. FAKUSE was made
a permanent command post location, and necessary preparations were pushed forward.
2. In view of the situation in the BURMA area, it was decided to reorganize thd command system of the BURMA area army and the 39th army; and this decision ' was reported.
Note:
Details of the. Reorganization of the command system in BURMA and THILAND,
The BURMA area army and the 39th army had previously had a very close connection. A study had been made since the beginning of the year on the reorganization of the command system. The plan gave the BURMA area army, which had lost the position of an area army after its collapse as the BURMA area army, the command of the 39th army. It was thought appropriate to reorganize the Z9th army into the area army and have one army in the BURMA AREA as the advance guard in the THATLAND defense. Therefore the southern army issued the order on 7 July.
3. In the BURMA area, the concentration of the main force east of the SITTANG River was almost completed by the mid le of June; but the 28th army was still fighting desperately by itself in enemy territory in the northern sector of RANGOON. At that time, because of the situation in the MALAY area, the southern army had charge of the area army, which was studying the operation to recaptuee RANGOON; but the 28th army gradually became short of rations.
The SITTANG Elver flooded when the rainy season set in and the river basin became a sea of mud. So operation was finally suspended, consequently, the area army concentrated the main body of the 28th army to the east of the SITTANG Elver and strengthened the position surrounding MOULMEIN in order to take up its task of being the vanguard in the defense of THAILAND, it also planned the SITTANG Battle. *
The main body of the 33re army crossed the SITTANG River south of SITTANG and occupied as many of the enemy as pos ible. During this period, the 28th army was ordered to cross the SITTANG River north of SITTANG and move to the sector east of the rifer. The date was set for 20 July.
4. The Southern army then decided to strengthen the position? in the MALAY-THAILAND, and FHENCE-INDO-CHINA areas by restoring the rtrength of an infantry group withdrawn from the BURMA area. In June the 56th Division was put under the command of the 39th army and the 55th Division, under the 38th army. In August,, the 31st Division was put under the command of the 7th area army; and the 33rd Division, under the 18th area army.
Prior to this in June, the Grand Imperial Headquarters , the Southern Army and the 39th army did not agree on the means of using the 37th Division; but, in the middle of July was decided to transfer the division to MALAYA. Note:
Details on the transfef of the 37th Division to MALAY. In view of the situation in the BURMA area after the adoption of military control of FRENCH-INDO-CHINA, the southern army planned to transfer the 37th in April to reinforce the positions in the cer-ical region of MALAYA. It was immediately transferred to BANGKOK and placed under the command of the 39th army.
In May, as the BURMA situation became critical, the problem arose as to whether the 37th"Division should be stationed in THAILAND or to plan to rccapttee RANGOON by throwing the force into the BURMA area, or to sufficiently strengthen the MALAY positions, at that time the leading echo'on of the 37th Division had arrived and was responsible for the strengthening of defenses surrounding BANGKOK; the rear echelon was still in Northern ERENCH-INDO-CHINA. In the . .southern sector of BANGKOK. _ transpor^atio^/aas at-a sjjandstill_duevto the shipp^. ' "ing of ratTEns to MALAYA and the * Vr&nsppivtation of . the '70 th. Mixed .Brigade
to southern MALAY, as well-as' to the bombing and •daircr.age by iSood. *
The 39th Army reported several time on the stationing of the 37th division in THAILAND. The Grand Imperial Headquarters also considered this; but in July after a careful examination, the southern army appointed the leading echelon to undertake the strengthening of defenses in the vicinity of BANGKOK, while under the command of the 39 army. Meanchile, the main body which was waiting for the arrival of the S^d Division was to be transferred to northern MALAYA and to come under the command of the 7th area army. Its arrival in MALAYA was scheduled for about the end of August. t
5. At the end of June, a staff officer was despatched from the Grand Imperial Headquarters. Confidential talks were car led out about the operational plan of the southern army and other important matters. At the end of July, As istant Chief of Staff WACHI was dispatched to TOKYO in response to an order of the Grand Imperial Headquartere. Ee reported on the situation of the southern
army as well as important matters concerned with the operation. In particular liaison was oh tained, as well as a definite plan concerning the independence of the JAVA and SUMATRA ABBAS and the reorganization of the pesitiene. On 4 August the necessary order was issued hut the war cane te an end without its being carried out.
Paragraph 3 War Situation in the PHILIPPINE AREA. \
Communication with the 14th area amy Vas cut in the middle of June. The area army headquarters eeened to have transferred te FANDAN en 25 June.
Paragraph 4 Situation in the BORNEO AREA.
On 8 June, a part of the AUSTRALIAN ARMY landed at LABUAW Island and then at BALIK PAP AN on 1 July with approximately 5000 nen. The 37th army close by cooperated with the army and navy; but it could not display any effective strength in its act lone. The enemy air baee in the BORNEO area was completed. Strict security was then required against the attack towards SINGAPORE. **
Paragraph 5 Situation in the other areas.
\
1. In the North AUSTRALIAN area, the speedier withdrawal of troops was required; and the plan of withdrawing troope was changed in July. The area in which the withdrawal could be made easily was first decided, end the immediate reinforcement of the SINGAPORE area was planned.
2. The preparations en SINGAPORE Island became nore urgent; artillery forcee were transferred from the SUMATRA and JAVA areas fsr the reorganization of a division of the SINGAPORE defense unit.
C
Paragraph 6 The situation of the 3rd Air Army.
After the decisive battle of the PHILIPPINES, the 3rd Air Army was fighting horoicaly performing several duties at the ease time. However, at the end of June, it received the order that ite main body must bs transferred to the TAIWAN sC&kt -It n*d been decided that 5 fighter regiments, 2 Ind. Companies, 1 light bomber regiment and 3 heavy bomber regiments.would' be withdrawn and transferred.
2. Conforming te the above nentioned order, the FORMOSAN army, the CHINA Expeditionary Force and the southern army completed their transfer with compar-itigoly light losses.
3. Furthermore, the air strength of the southern army was greatly weakened; and any operation needing air support was not desirable.
Paragraph 7 Termination of the War.
£ -
The southern army conquered all difficulties in the forth of certain victory in the decisive battle of the homeland. The commander in Chief and hie subordinate pressed the completion of the preparations for the defense of the homeland by strengthening the defencee on the INDO-CHINA peninsula end the staategic areas surrounding SINGAPORE. Then, it suddenly received an order en the termination of the war. All officers and nen suspended their combat operations.
The situation at the end ef the war and immediately afterward was generally as fellowst
1. The southern army received reperte about the Empire's ending ef the wax from about 10 August; but waa net known whether it was true or not. In addition reperte concerning the any were conflicting. However, on the 15th, the Imperial Rescript en the ending ef the war waa received. The commander in, chief invited the 7th area army commander, the 3rd air army commander, the commander in chief ef the 10th area fleet and Chief of Staffs of each unit which were under the direct command ef the General Headquarters at DAELOT. He stated that the southern army should receive the Imperial Rescript respectfully and should comply with His -Majesty's wishes. He made the necessary arrangements te suspend operations. Howevert in the area engaged in battle, the situation was not easily controlled* Due te the necessity of negotiation to suspend operations in each eecter, the southern army ordered on 22 August that each unit in each sector could negotiate with the frontal enemy concerning the steps.
2. The southern army, on 24 August, managed to place the 38th army north of Lat. 16 V. and ths 14th area army under the direct command of ths Commander in Chief ef the CHINA Expeditionary Force and the Grand Imperial Headquarters.
On the 30th, the 18th Army was excluded from the Southern army battle order of the 8th area army.
3. On 21 August, ths Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces demanded that immediate steps for surrender should be taken. He requested an interview with a plenipotentiary delegate on 23 August at RANGOON. The southern army delegate Chief of Staff NUMATA, departed from SAIGON on 25 August, and on the 26th met with representative BROWNING, the Chief of Staff of the Allied Forces, carried out the necessary talks with him and received a copy of the document for the surrender which would be signed later.
4. On 12 September, the Southern army representative, General ITAGAKI accompanied by General KIKURA, Lt. Gen. UNO SHI RA, Lt. Gen. NAKAMURA, Lt. Gen. SHIBATA placed his seal on ths historical document of surrender to the Allied - Seres at the ..special. City hall of SINGAPORE. The time was 1341 hours.
(Tho position of the south- rn army at the end of the war is shewn in the inserted figure Is. 2.)
Situation of tho Southern Forces at the lad of the War.

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